scholarly journals Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (11) ◽  
pp. 3699-3732
Author(s):  
Federico Echenique ◽  
Antonio Miralles ◽  
Jun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Assignment Problems ◽  
Efficient Market ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Knapsack Constraints ◽  
Pecuniary Externalities ◽  
Allocation Problems

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21)

scholarly journals Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 585-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Budish ◽  
Yeon-Koo Che ◽  
Fuhito Kojima ◽  
Paul Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
School Choice ◽  
Real World ◽  
Random Allocation ◽  
Assignment Problems ◽  
Matching Problems ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Controlled Choice ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world constraints, such as group-specific quotas (“controlled choice”) in school choice and house allocation, and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation. We develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments, and that incorporate certain non-additive substitutable preferences. We also develop a “utility guarantee” technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations, supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization. This can be applied to multi-unit assignment problems and certain two-sided matching problems. (JEL C78, D82)

Using AHP for resource allocation problems

1995 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 410-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Ramanathan ◽  
L.S. Ganesh
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Allocation Problems
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