Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchanges. This paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras–Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. This methodology is based on an interdisciplinary analysis of an abstract exchange model in the form of a system of equations. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

On Pentagonal Controlled Fuzzy Metric Spaces with an Application to Dynamic Market Equilibrium

In this manuscript, we coined pentagonal controlled fuzzy metric spaces and fuzzy controlled hexagonal metric space as generalizations of fuzzy triple controlled metric spaces and fuzzy extended hexagonal b-metric spaces. We use a control function in fuzzy controlled hexagonal metric space and introduce five noncomparable control functions in pentagonal controlled fuzzy metric spaces. In the scenario of pentagonal controlled fuzzy metric spaces, we prove the Banach fixed point theorem, which generalizes the Banach fixed point theorem for the aforementioned spaces. An example is offered to support our main point. We also presented an application to dynamic market equilibrium.

Labor Markets

What is the labor market? Like the goods and services markets, a labor market consists of the supply and demand sides. In the labor market, while workers supply labor, firms demand labor. This chapter studies the backward-bending nature of the labor supply curve and the downward-sloping nature of the labor demand curve. We also analyze the labor market equilibrium in a perfectly competitive labor market. Several policies such as immigration and minimum wage will be introduced to illustrate how government policies affect the labor market equilibrium.

Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchange. The paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras-Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchange. The paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras-Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21)

A Simple Method for Bounding the Elasticity of Growing Demand with Applications to the Analysis of Historic Antitrust Cases

We propose a simple method, requiring only minimal data, for bounding demand elasticities in growing, homogeneous-product markets. Since growing demand curves cannot cross, shifts in market equilibrium over time can be used to “funnel” the demand curve into a narrow region, bounding its slope. Our featured application assesses the antitrust remedy in the 1952 DuPont decision, ordering incumbents to license patents for commercial plastics. We bound the demand elasticity significantly below 1 in many post-remedy years, inconsistent with monopoly, supporting the remedy’s effectiveness. A second application investigates whether the 1911 dissolution of American Tobacco fostered competition in the cigarette market. (JEL K21, L24, L65, L66, N41, N42, O34)