General Organizational Classification: An Empirical Test Using the United States and Japanese Electronics Industries

1990 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Ulrich ◽  
Bill McKelvey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
The United States

scholarly journals Is There a Male Marital Wage Premium? New Evidence from the United States

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 744-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Ludwig ◽  
Josef Brüderl
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Wage Growth ◽  
The United States ◽  
Wage Premium ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Married Men

This study reconsiders the phenomenon that married men earn more money than unmarried men, a key result of the research on marriage benefits. Many earlier studies have found such a “male marital wage premium.” Recent studies using panel data for the United States conclude that part of this premium is due to selection of high earners into marriage. Nevertheless, a substantial effect of marriage seems to remain. The current study investigates whether the remaining premium is really a causal effect. Using conventional fixed-effects models, previous studies statistically controlled for selection based on wage levels only. We suggest a more general fixed-effects model that allows for higher wage growth of to-be-married men. The empirical test draws on panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979 to 2012). We replicate the main finding of the literature: a wage premium remains after controlling for selection on individual wage levels. However, the remaining effect is not causal. The results show that married men earn more because selection into marriage operates not only on wage levels but also on wage growth. Hence, men on a steep career track are especially likely to marry. We conclude that arguments postulating a wage premium for married men should be discarded.

Explaining varying lobbying styles across the Atlantic: an empirical test of the cultural and institutional explanations

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 459-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Arlo Poletti ◽  
Jan Beyers
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
The United States ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Observational Equivalence ◽  
The Us ◽  
United Nation ◽  
International Diplomatic Conferences

AbstractThere is consensus in the literature that policymaking in the United States (US) and Europe generates different lobbying styles. Two explanations for these differences have been developed so far. The first posits that distinct lobbying styles reflect differentpolitical cultures. The second attributes distinct lobbying styles to variation in theinstitutionalcontext in which lobbyists operate. Studies that have analysed lobbying within the US and Europe and assessed the relative importance of these arguments are problematic because both explanations are consistent with observed differences in lobbying style. In this article, we circumvent problems of observational equivalence by focussing on European and American lobbyists who are active in a similar institutional venue – that is, international diplomatic conferences. Relying on evidence collected at World Trade Organization Ministerial Conferences and United Nation Climate Summits, we tested the relevance of alternative explanations for the variation in lobbying styles between European and American lobbyists. Our results give robust support to the institutional argument.

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