The Great Rapprochement

2021 ◽  
pp. 114-152
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter examines Anglo-American relations during the great rapprochement (1895-1906). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how key British and American decision makers thought about each other’s intentions in five episodes: the onset and aftermath of the crisis over Venezuela; the events surrounding the Spanish-American War; the negotiations regarding a trans-isthmian canal; the inception and resolution of a dispute over the Canada-Alaska boundary; and Anglo-American relations in the Far East between the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that London and Washington were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each episode, the chapter concludes by describing the shape of the resulting Anglo-American security competition in the Western Hemisphere, before examining Britain’s decision to quit that contest in 1904-6.

Author(s):  
Stephen Bowman

The introduction provides a grounding in the diplomatic history of Anglo-American relations and surveys the main events of the so-called ‘Great Rapprochement’ between the two countries, including the Alaskan Boundary Dispute, Britain’s response to the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the US’s subsequent attitude to Britain’s war with the Boers. The introduction analyses the concept of ‘Anglo-Saxonism’ and discusses the ways in which it was important both to the Pilgrims Society and to official Anglo-American relations. The introduction also provides a chapter by chapter breakdown of the rest of the book and outlines the argument that while the Pilgrims never set the agenda for official Anglo-American relations it nevertheless played a leading role in public diplomacy and, by extension, in how people have thought about how Britain and the United States have related to each other.


1958 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-175
Author(s):  
A. E. Campbell

When, in the last years of the nineteenth century, the United States shared the general expansive urge, the major Power with which she came most vigorously and immediately into conflict was Great Britain, which alone had a substantial footing in the western hemisphere. On at least three important occasions the two countries clashed–over Venezuela, over the building of an isthmian canal, and over the Alaskan boundary–and on each the United States won a complete diplomatic victory, as a natural result of power and strategic advantage. These victories roused little resentment in Britain and their significance was minimized. One important reason for the readiness with which Britain gave way to the United States was that the two countries were supposed to have some mystic community of interest which over-rode any conflicts and made them of no importance. Often the argument, if so it may be called, rested there, and it was merely asserted that ‘in the last resort’ the Anglo-Saxon nations would be found on the same side–not a prospect of much concern to the practising diplomatist. Sometimes, however, it was implied that the United States was on the brink of a great burst of international energy, which would, as a result of the similarity of race, ideology and tradition, be exerted in directions which the British would find good. The same American aggressiveness whose first victim was Britain would later check the rivals of Britain.


1963 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Clifford

Most of the scholarly works on British policy in the years preceding World War II have neglected events in the Far East in favor of those in Europe. Any study of recent British diplomacy is, of course, seriously hampered by the lack of Foreign Office documents and by the generally uninformative nature of British memoirs. Nevertheless, the sources which do exist give a picture which, while still incomplete, is interesting for its own sake in showing how the Chamberlain Government met the problems of the Pacific, and also for the light which it sheds on Anglo-American relations in this period. Perhaps nowhere else was there as much consistent misunderstanding and disappointment between London and Washington as over the questions raised by the Sino-Japanese War. The Manchurian episode had left a legacy of distrust between the two countries; just enough was known about the approaches made by the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, so that many on both sides of the Atlantic believed that Britain had rejected American offers for joint action against Japan in 1932, and that as a result nothing had prevented the Japanese advance. When Stimson's The Far Eastern Crisis appeared in 1936, it was read by many with more enthusiasm than accuracy, and seemed to confirm these views. In Britain it provided ammunition for the critics of the Government, while in the United States it increased the suspicions of those unwilling to trust Britain, and strengthened the trend to isolation.


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