Comparative Law in the House of Lords and Supreme Court

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Stanton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
House Of Lords

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

Comparative Law in the NJAC Judgment

2018 ◽  
pp. 197-207
Author(s):  
Suhrith Parthasarathy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
International Experience ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
The Supreme Court

This essay is an overview of the use of comparative law in the NJAC Case, and offers a critique of the Supreme Court’s analysis of comparative law in judicial appointments. The essay argues that the Supreme Court adopted an isolationist approach by shunning international experience from fifteen countries cited before it by the Union of India to drive home the point that executive presence in judicial appointments does not, by itself, impinge upon judicial independence. The author contests the Supreme Court’s cursory dismissal of relevant international experience on the ground that India, with its peculiar set of circumstances cannot replicate the experiences of other nations in judicial appointments. The author argues that this is self-serving and the judgment would have been better served by a surer grasp of comparative law and its rationales.

11. The Interpretation of Contracts

Contract Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 363-379
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Scheme ◽  
Building Society ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.

11. The Interpretation of Contracts

Contract Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McKendrick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Compensation Scheme ◽  
Building Society ◽  
Ordinary Meaning ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court

This chapter focuses on the principles applied by the courts when interpreting contracts, as set out by the House of Lords in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society and the Supreme Court in Arnold v. Britton and Wood v. Capita Insurance Services Ltd. The chapter discusses the scope of these principles (in particular, the ‘factual matrix’, the exclusion of pre-contractual negotiations, the meaning of words, ‘corrective interpretation’, and the balance to be struck between the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and giving to the words a commercial sensible construction.

Supreme Courts in the 21st Century: should organisation follow the function?

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Alan Uzelac
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Special Functions ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Organisational Structures ◽  
Per Capita

The text discusses different aspects connected with organisation of supreme courts. It argues that the focus should be shifted to the “how” question. If the supreme courts aspire to fulfil certain special functions, a necessary precondition towards fulfilling this goal entails appropriate organisational structures, means and personnel. The organisation, framework and methods of work of a supreme court should reflect the functions that it is supposed to serve. Although most supreme courts have staff, departments and offices that are entrusted with legal research and analysis, the rise in importance of international jurisprudence is putting on the agenda the need for restructuring and reinforcing the existing departments. The author claims that supreme courts are becoming less and less self-centred in their adjudication, which requires legal research of international and comparative law. The text also deals with other aspects of supreme courts’ organisation. For instance, it shifts focus towards the relation between the number of judges in a supreme court and its impact on the uniformity of jurisprudence. It also emphasises the need to further examine the relation between the number of judges per capita and the efficiency of the court’s work.

scholarly journals Human Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The paper examines whether there was any basis for Parliament to enact section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 in regard to human rights decisions of the Court of Appeal. The paper asks whether the Court of Appeal has indeed been "activist" in its human rights decisions. The discussion focuses on the areas where judicial activism might be suspected, firstly the filling of legislative gaps, and secondly statutory interpretation, with a special focus on implied repeal. Relevant decisions of the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) are used as a contrast to the decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been activist in the area of human rights.

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