Protecting Research Confidentiality : Towards a Research-Participant Shield Law

Author(s):  
Ted Palys ◽  
John Lowman

RésuméLa protection de la confidentialité des recherches est un principe intégral de toutes les sciences sociales, ainsi que des codes d'éthique de l'humanité. Mais que se passerait-il si une juridiction exigerait l'accès à des informations confidentielles sur des recherches, tant dans le cas de litiges au civil, que pour des affaires criminelles? Au Canada, seules les informations provenant des recherches de Statistiques Canada jouissent de ce privilège relatif à la preuve—une juridiction ne peut exiger une divulgation. Tous les autres chercheurs devront faire appel à la common law afin de protéger des recherches confidentielles. Il leur appartiendrait, pour chaque cas, d'apporter la preuve de la nécessité de garder confidentielle toute information sur ces recherches, avec le risque malheureux qu'une juridiction ordonne leur divulgation. Cet article décrit cinq problèmes découlant de l'état du droit. Les protections juridiques de la confidentialité de la recherche ont encore beaucoup de chemin à parcourir avant de résoudre ces problèmes. Mais comment se présenteront ces protections? Qui aura à les gérer? La deuxième partie de cet article examine les protections législatives des privilèges relatifs à la preuve, y compris la Loi sur les statistiques, et la Loi canadienne sur la preuve, ainsi que les «certificats de confidentialité» (pour certains types de recherches en santé) et les «certificats de vie privée» (pour certaines enquêtes criminelles) des États-Unis, en vue d'établir des critères permettant l'établissement d'une loi protégeant la recherche canadienne.

Author(s):  
Ted Palys ◽  
James L. Turk ◽  
John Lowman

AbstractMany types of vital research require protection of communication and information provided confidentially by research participants. In Canada, apart from information collected under the Statistics Act, the only option is a common law balancing test that creates uncertainty insofar as law is made after the fact. This paper explores the option of statute-based protection from the outset. It examines two such protections that have been in place in the United States for decades—revealing their strengths and weaknesses and how they may be applied in the Canadian context.


2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (4) ◽  
pp. 881-907
Author(s):  
Donrich W Thaldar ◽  
Bonginkosi Shozi

Whether human biological material (‘HBM’) in the research context is susceptible of ownership is contested, yet under-investigated. This situation leads to legal uncertainty for local scientists and their international collaborators. This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the topic — investigating both common law and statutory law — and concludes that HBM in the research context is indeed susceptible of ownership. First, since the common law is dynamic, it should recognise the reality that HBM has become useful in the research context and should therefore treat HBM in this context as susceptible of being owned. This aligns with the general trend in comparative foreign case law. Secondly, since relevant statutes consistently use the legal-technical term ‘donation’ to denote a situation where HBM is provided by a research participant to a research institution for the purposes of research, the transfer of ownership in the donated HBM from the research participant to the research institution is a statutory requirement. This necessarily implies that HBM in the research context is indeed susceptible of ownership and, moreover, that HBM in the research context is owned by research institutions and not research participants.


2011 ◽  
pp. 163-169
Author(s):  
Lina Trudel

Cet article vise à mettre en évidence le rôle central des médias dans la vie privée et publique. L’auteur s’étonne du peu d’attention que leur accordent les sciences sociales. Elle interpelle les chercheurs sur l’urgence d’analyser les conséquences sur la qualité de la vie sociale et démocratique de l’usage abusif des medias à des fins commerciales.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-337
Author(s):  
Steve Hedley

In this article, Professor Steve Hedley offers a Common Law response to he recently published arguments of Professor Nils Jansen on the German law of unjustified enrichment (as to which, see Jansen, “Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment” (2016) 20 EdinLR 123). The author takes the view that Jansen's paper provided a welcome opportunity to reconsider not merely what unjust enrichment can logically be, but what it is for. He argues that unjust enrichment talk contributes little of value, and that the supposedly logical process of stating it at a high level of abstraction, and then seeking to deduce the law from that abstraction, merely distracts lawyers from the equities of the cases they consider.


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