Territorial Politics and the Party System in Spain: Continuity and Change since the Financial Crisis, Caroline Gray (2020)

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97
Author(s):  
Nathan Jones

Review of: Territorial Politics and the Party System in Spain: Continuity and Change since the Financial Crisis, Caroline Gray (2020) Abingdon: Routledge, 167 pp., ISBN 978-1-85743-983-0, h/bk, £84.00, ISBN 978-0-42929-006-0, e/bk, £25.89

Asian Survey ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 937-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajni Kothari

Author(s):  
Chase Foster

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i1.1233


Author(s):  
David Denver ◽  
Mark Garnett

This chapter examines the closely fought elections of 2010 and 2015, the first of which produced the first British coalition government since 1945 in a period which saw the continued fragmentation of the party system and the rise of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Scottish National Party (SNP).Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister in 2007, and initially impressions were favourable. However, almost as soon as Brown had decided against a ‘snap’ election to exploit his popularity, events turned against him and his party. The worldwide global financial crisis, which began in 2007, hit Britain particularly hard, and like Major’s Conservatives in the previous decade New Labour lost its reputation for economic competence. The Conservatives, under David Cameron who proclaimed himself ‘the heir to Blair’, won the largest number of seats in the 2010 election, which was particularly noteworthy for the introduction of televised leader debates. However, the 2010 contest resulted in a ‘hung parliament’ and a coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The key events of the ensuing five years are examined, including the introduction of a Fixed-Term Parliaments Act which purportedly deprived Prime Ministers of the right to call elections at times of their own choosing. There were also referendums of Electoral Reform (2011) and Scottish independence (2014), in which the status quo was upheld without seeming to put an end to either question. In particular, the SNP continued to prosper despite the 2014 result, and in the 2015 general election it won almost all of the Scottish parliamentary seats. In England, UKIP had become a very serious threat both to Labour and the Conservatives, who had imposed unpopular cuts in public expenditure (‘austerity’) in response to the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats had lost much of their electoral appeal during their ill-fated alliance with Cameron’s Conservatives. The overall result of the 2015 election was an overall victory for the Conservatives, but by a margin which left Cameron vulnerable to Eurosceptics within his party.


Author(s):  
Stella Ladi ◽  
Vivian Spyropoulou

The Greek crisis started in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008, and it officially ended in August 2018 when Greece exited the Third Economic Adjustment Programme that it had signed with its international lenders to avoid default. Greece had to seek help from international lenders, including the European Commission (EC), European Central Bank (ECB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and, in the last program, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), three times (2010, 2012, and 2015). The crisis soon spread to other European Monetary Union (EMU) countries—namely Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus—and it was transformed into a Eurozone crisis, with some commonalities but with different characteristics in each case. The Greek crisis was a sovereign debt crisis that resulted from a continuous aggravation of the national economic indicators, such as growth, inflation, and unemployment, serious long term structural shortcomings, and the pressure from the global financial crisis. The economic crisis was soon translated into a political crisis that shook the Greek party system and strengthened more radical parties such as the left-wing Syriza and the neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Strong one-party governments became a memory of the past and were replaced by short-lived coalition governments. The economic pressure also led to a serious social crisis with rising poverty levels, unprecedented numbers of homeless, and a welfare system unable to cope with the increasing demands. It posed questions about the shape of Greece’s political and social institutions, its legal system and Constitution, and its public administration’s capability to cope with the crisis and implement the conditionality attached to the three economic adjustment programs. Last but not least, the Greek crisis brought into fore the weaknesses and discrepancies of the EMU and was the motive behind important structural reforms, such as the creation of new financial assistance and surveillance mechanisms, including the ESM, as well as the strengthening of informal institutions such as the Euro summits. The discussion was soon extended to a questioning of the viability of the European Union (EU) project, the role of Germany, and the changing Europeanization mechanisms. The bibliography about the Greek crisis developed quickly and covers economic, political, social, and legal issues concerning not only Greece, but also the EU as a whole, taking the case of Greece as a starting point.


1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-234
Author(s):  
James A. Curry

One of the more recent drop-outs from the world's electoral club was the Philippines, a nation with a remarkably stable two-party system stretching, in the years since independence, over some twenty-five years. With the imposition of martial law in September 1972, the curtain was drawn, at least temporarily, on the longest running democracy in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this study is neither to praise nor bury the pre-1972 Philippine electoral system, but rather to look more closely at some recurring patterns which emerged during this period—patterns which, it will be argued, conform to a “machine model” of politics.


Author(s):  
Chase Foster

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.


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