Economic Patriotism After the Crisis: Explaining Continuity and Change in European Securities Enforcement

Author(s):  
Chase Foster

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i1.1233

Author(s):  
Chase Foster

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Sue Jaffer ◽  
Nicholas Morris

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had dire implications for the UK, creating massive unemployment and years of austerity.  This paper looks at the underlying causes of the crisis, together with the reasons why financial regulation in the UK failed to prevent the financial crash. The UK sought to learn the lessons from its failure, and many inquiries, research reports and books have explored the causes and compounding factors. The book “Capital Failure” identified that trust was fundamental to the working of the financial sector, and that the erosion of trust and trustworthy behaviour has had a disastrous effect.  Australia escaped relatively unscathed from the GFC, yet recent inquiries into the banking and superannuation sectors have revealed a similar dramatic decline in trustworthiness and ethical standards of behaviour. The article examines how the Australian banking environment evolved, the implication of recent developments including Fintech and Regtech, and what lessons Australia can learn from overseas experience.    


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 557-591
Author(s):  
Andri Fannar Bergþórsson

In response to the global financial crisis, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created in 2010. Supranational bodies were established for different financial sectors to act as supervisors of sorts for national-level supervisors in EU Member States. This article focuses on how the system was adapted to three EFTA States that are not part of the EU but form the internal market along with EU Member States through the EEA Agreement – Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein (EEA EFTA States). The aim is to clarify how ESFS has been incorporated into the EEA agreement and to discuss whether this a workable solution for the EEA EFTA States that have not transferred their sovereignty by name in the same manner as the EU Member States. One issue is whether the adaptation has gone beyond the limits of the two-pillar structure, as all initiative and work stem from the EU supranational bodies and not the EFTA pillar.


2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. R1-R15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erland W. Nier

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.


Author(s):  
Oonagh McDonald

This chapter traces the history of financial regulation in the UK. It challenges the widely held belief that the period from the 1980s witnessed a systematic process of deregulation. In fact, from the 1970s there was a period of increasing regulation up until the mid-2000s, when the government began to encourage a ‘light touch’ approach. The combination of all these factors meant that banks were ill-prepared to meet the financial crisis. In its aftermath, as the banks embarked on the slow path to recovery, making profits was essential. The traders seized any opportunity they could, and it may well be the case that banks were simply relieved that some areas of their business were profitable.


Author(s):  
Alex Brummer

This chapter examines the contribution of recognized activities that make the UK economy, such as the progress in research, pharmaceuticals, technology, software, and innovation that can be traced back to the intellectual powerhouses of UK's institutions of higher learning. It recounts the UK's love–hate relationship with the City of London, wherein the banks are still blamed for the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the subsequent stagnation and fall in incomes. It also cites finance as the highest UK earner of overseas income and is a magnet for international institutions. The chapter describes London as the biggest financial centre outside New York and has attracted even greater numbers of skilled financial traders since the EU referendum result of 2016. It explains how the UK financial sector accommodated trading, provided credit, and raised new capital for troubled firms and those seeking post-Covid-19 opportunities.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu

In the wake of the global financial crisis, the trajectory of legal reforms is likely to turn towards more transparency regulation. This article argues that transparency regulation will take on a new role of surveillance as intelligence and data mining expand in the wholesale financial sector, supporting the creation of designated systemic risk oversight regulators.The role of market discipline, which has been acknowledged to be weak leading up to the financial crisis, is likely to be eclipsed by a more technocratic governance in the financial sector. In this article, however, concerns are raised about the expansion of technocratic surveillance and whether financial sector participants would internalise the discipline of regulatory control. Certain endemic features of the financial sector will pose challenges for financial regulation even in the surveillance age.


Author(s):  
Spangler Timothy

This chapter focuses on the increase in the amount of litigation and enforcement actions against private investment funds in the United States, the UK, and across the globe as a result of the global financial crisis. As more disputes arose during the course of the global financial crisis, the legal and regulatory regime impacting private investment funds has been the subject of closer scrutiny than has been seen in previous decades. The chapter first considers the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) enforcement actions against hedge funds as well as U.S. civil litigation prior to the financial crisis before discussing Dodd-Frank and its effect on enforcement. It then examines the SEC’s enforcement actions regarding broker-dealer registration, along with some of its key enforcement actions after Dodd-Frank. It also analyses the Financial Conduct Authority’s enforcement priorities after the global financial crisis and key litigation in the UK involving private investment funds.


2020 ◽  
Vol 253 ◽  
pp. R18-R28
Author(s):  
Marianne Sensier ◽  
Fiona Devine

We investigate economic resilience of UK regions before, during and after the 2007/8 global financial crisis. We date business cycle turning points in real output, employment and productivity to assess the resilience dimensions of resistance, recovery and renewal and rank the economic resilience of regions in a resilience scorecard. Our empirical results reveal that the business cycle in productivity has not returned to its pre-recession peak level for Yorkshire and the Humber and the employment level has not recovered in Scotland. The resilience scorecard ranks the South East as the most resilient region with Northern Ireland the least resilient.


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