The shift to the defined contribution pension scheme: an Italian case

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Massimo Angrisani ◽  
Giovanni Di Nella ◽  
Cinzia Di Palo
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Cinzia Di Palo ◽  
Massimo Angrisani ◽  
Giovanni Di Nella

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Jędrzychowska ◽  
Ilona Kwiecień ◽  
Ewa Poprawska

A gender gap in pensions has recently been discussed in the context of non-discrimination and the sustainability of pension systems. Such systems in Europe are evolving towards strengthening the role of individual contributions from periods of paid work. Among other factors, the women’s pension gap is affected by interruptions in employment arising from care responsibilities. The purpose of this article is to measure the pension gap associated with having children in defined contribution pension systems. Using financial mathematics, the retirement capital of a childless woman (without breaks in work) was determined and compared with mothers of 1–4 children. The results indicate that the motherhood pension gap is approximately 4.5%–9.5%, 7.5%–15%, 9%–20%, and 12.5%–25% for mothers of 1, 2, 3, and 4 children, respectively. Measuring these individual gaps allows the cost of investing in children to be estimated. Significant for systemic and individual decisions is that the gap size is highest by the first and the second child, however the decision about the third child—relevant to the demography as ensuring the generational replacement—means the whole pension gap could rise to 20%. This could help support a policy of counteracting adverse demographic trends in fertility rates through the building of socially sustainable pensions schemes. In terms of future research, it forms the basis for building a gap measurement model that takes into account various drivers of the gender gap.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 677-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Alonso-García ◽  
Pierre Devolder

AbstractThe notional defined contribution pension scheme combines pay-as-you-go financing and a defined contribution pension formula. The return on contributions is based on an index set by law, such as the growth rate of GDP, average wages or contribution payments. The volatility of this return compromises the system's pension adequacy and therefore guarantees may be needed. Here, we provide a minimum return guarantee to the pension contributions. The price is calculated in a utility indifference framework. We obtain a closed-form solution for a general dependence structure with exponential preferences and in presence of stochastic short interest rates.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARJEN SIEGMANN

AbstractWe compute minimum nominal funding ratios for defined-benefit (DB) plans based on the expected utility that can be achieved in a defined-contribution (DC) pension scheme. Using Monte Carlo simulation, expected utility is computed for three different specifications of utility: power utility, mean-shortfall, and mean-downside deviation. Depending on risk aversion and the level of sophistication assumed for the DC scheme, minimum acceptable funding ratios are between 0.87 and 1.20 in nominal terms. For relative risk aversion of 5 and a DC scheme with a fixed-contribution setup, the minimum nominal funding ratio is between 0.87 and 0.98. The attractiveness of the DB plan increases with the expected equity premium and the fraction invested in stocks. We conclude that the expected value of intergenerational solidarity, providing time-diversification to its participants, can be large. Minimum funding ratios in real (inflation-adjusted) terms lie between 0.56 and 0.79. Given a DB pension fund with a funding ratio of 1.30, a participant in a DC plan has to pay a 2.7 to 6.1% point higher contribution on average to achieve equal expected utility.


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