Chapter 3 Dissociation as a Rhetorical Strategy in the Damascus Document (CD)

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-99

Why did Roman prosecutors typically accuse the defendant of multiple crimina, when in most standing criminal courts the punishment imposed on a guilty defendant was the same (typically “capital,” that is, a kind of exile), no matter how many charges were proven? The answer lies not in a failure to distinguish between legal charges leveled at the defendant and defamation of his character, but rather in a rhetorical strategy that made sense in light of what was legally necessary to obtain a conviction. The greater the number of charges, the more likely the jurors would be persuaded that the defendant had in some way violated the statute according to which the trial was being conducted. It is true that prosecutors typically argued that the defendant’s prior conduct made it plausible that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged, but in a way that, as much as possible, made his guilt on these particular charges seem likely, and defense patroni attempted to undermine the charges and the character defamation. This answer to the apparent contradiction between multiple charges and unitary punishment favors a moderate formalism over legal realism as the way to interpret Roman criminal trials.


1971 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. Foster
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-135
Author(s):  
Alison Schofield

Jodi Magness’ proposal that an altar existed at Qumran leaves some unanswered questions; nevertheless, her conclusions are worthy of consideration. This study examines her claim that the residents at Qumran had an altar, modeled off of the Wilderness Tabernacle, through the lens of critical spatial theory. The conceptual spaces of some of the Dead Sea Scrolls, such as The Damascus Document and The Community Rule, as well as the spatial practices of the site of Qumran do not rule out – and even support – the idea that Qumran itself was highly delimited and therefore its spaces hierarchized in such a way that it could have supported a central cultic site.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Hazel Tafadzwa Ngoshi

This article discusses the rhetorical construction of self-identity in Ian Smith's autobiography. I argue that in communicating self-identity and claiming historical agency, Smith deploys rhetoric born out of intertextuality. Intertextual references construct nation-building rhetoric that positions Smith as an agent of history. The article demonstrates that Smith's invocation of past texts and citations provokes unintended and problematic meanings. While Smith constructs rhetorical discourse, he is in turn also constructed by that discourse as a subject of history.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Kocsis ◽  
Adam Tamas Tuboly

AbstractOur main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach’s own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy (or philosophy of nature, Naturphilosophie) to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of ‘naturalism’ is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism—or, more appropriately, naturalisms—in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach’s naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of common-sense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions (assuming their naturalistic continuity), it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as “a crusade.” By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-be-written narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-253
Author(s):  
Emad Hamdeh

The Albanian scholar Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (d. 1999) established a unique type of Salafism, a movement whose adherents follow a puritanical model of Muslim creed, exegesis, and conduct that is critical of madhhab Traditionalism. In this article I present an annotated translation of an audio lecture in which Albānī attempted to defend Salafism against its anti-madhhab image. I shed light on the religious and social climate that played a critical role in triggering Albānī’s disdain for Traditionalism and led him to discredit madhhab Traditionalist fiqh and replace it with his own interpretation of the jurisprudential requirements of Islamic scripture. Among the arguments I make is that Albānī’s claim to follow only the Qurʾān and Sunna is a rhetorical strategy designed to present Salafism as the absolute truth and distinguish it from being categorized as another madhhab or religious movement.



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