Chapter Nine. The Mandate of the Ninth Amendment: Why Footnote Four Is Wrong

2014 ◽  
pp. 226-254
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter examines how a Presumption of Liberty can protect the unenumerable rights retained by the people by shifting the background interpretive presumption of constitutionality whenever legislation restricts the liberties of the people. One approach that judges may take toward legislation restricting the retained liberties of the people is to protect all the rights retained by the people equally whether enumerated or unenumerated. The question that arises is how one would identify the unenumerated rights retained by the people, or how to define the “substantive sphere of liberty” that is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because ignoring all unenumerated rights violates the mandate of the Ninth Amendment, the chapter considers two alternatives: using originalism to identify specific unenumerated rights and the Presumption of Liberty.


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This book examines whether the U.S. Constitution—either as written or as actually applied—is legitimate. It argues that the most commonly held view of constitutional legitimacy—the “consent of the governed”—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet. It shows why holding the Constitution to this unattainable ideal both undermines its legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text. The book considers the notion of “natural rights” as “liberty rights,” along with the nature and scope of the so-called police power of states. Furthermore, it analyzes the original meaning of key provisions of the text that have been either distorted or excised entirely from the judges' Constitution and ignored: the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause in the original Constitution, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


Author(s):  
Lash Kurt T

This chapter discusses how the transfigured Ninth Amendment, although used in support of a broad conception of individual freedom, has become a far smaller provision than that envisioned by its framers and has been rendered altogether unenforceable as an independent provision in the Bill of Rights. It describes how the Ninth Amendment has played an important role in matters involving the Supreme Court of the United States.


Author(s):  
Lash Kurt T

This chapter begins with a fairly exhaustive account of the use of the Ninth Amendment in state and federal courts prior to the New Deal. There is nothing new here in terms of theory: one finds the same analysis of the Ninth Amendment already developed in prior chapters repeated over and over again in state and federal courts throughout the Progressive era. There is a purpose, however, to including this history. One of the most durable myths about the Ninth Amendment is that it attracted little attention prior to the modern Supreme Court's discovery of the Ninth in Griswold v. Connecticut. The present discussion puts this myth permanently to rest. The second half of the chapter helps explain how the myth arose in the first place.


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