Retained by the People: The 'Silent' Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights Americans Don't Know They Have

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles D. Kelso ◽  
R. Randall Kelso
2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
John McGuire

In this paper, I reconstruct the notion of kratos as a unique and distinguishable exercise of political power. Using examples from 5th- and 4th-century Attic tragedy, Old Comedy, and forensic oratory, I show how kratos was used in Athenian cultural and political discourse to convey the irrefutability of a claim, the recognition of someone’s prevailing over another, and the sense of having the last word—all of which makes kratic power dependent upon its own continued demonstrability. I argue that the peculiarly performative character of kratos has little or no role within contemporary democratic thinking because the agency of the dēmos is largely mediated through the mechanisms of electoral success and constitutional rights. Nevertheless—and regardless of whether they are ultimately successful in achieving their stated political aims—the spontaneous, organisationally diffuse protests operating extra-institutionally under the banners of #MeToo and Black Lives Matter reveal how the attempted ‘domestication’ of kratos, and the sublimation of its peculiar power into piecemeal reform, was never a realistic or satisfactory answer for democratic discontent.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Naseem Razi ◽  
Rashida Zahoor ◽  
Ghulam Abbas

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protects its citizens by guaranteeing some fundamental rights. It is, however, a matter of great concern that these rights do not cover the "right to access the necessities of life like access to clean water, food, clothing, shelter, and medicine etc". It, thus, leads imperfection of the constitutional rights. Therefore, this study aims to highlight this gap by evaluating the constitutional fundamental rights in the light of the necessities of life. This study concludes that lack of access to the necessities of life has made the people least concern towards the national issues and development of the country. Hence, this paper recommends filling up this gap and to incorporate the "right to access to the necessities of life" in the Constitution 1973.


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter examines how a Presumption of Liberty can protect the unenumerable rights retained by the people by shifting the background interpretive presumption of constitutionality whenever legislation restricts the liberties of the people. One approach that judges may take toward legislation restricting the retained liberties of the people is to protect all the rights retained by the people equally whether enumerated or unenumerated. The question that arises is how one would identify the unenumerated rights retained by the people, or how to define the “substantive sphere of liberty” that is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because ignoring all unenumerated rights violates the mandate of the Ninth Amendment, the chapter considers two alternatives: using originalism to identify specific unenumerated rights and the Presumption of Liberty.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1039-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.J. Waluchow

In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy.


Daedalus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 142 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina M. Rodríguez

In considering what it means to treat immigration as a “civil rights” matter, I identify two frameworks for analysis. The first, universalistic in nature, emanates from personhood and promises non-citizens the protection of generally applicable laws and an important set of constitutional rights. The second seeks full incorporation for non-citizens into “the people,” a composite that evolves over time through social contestation – a process that can entail enforcement of legal norms but that revolves primarily around political argument. This pursuit of full membership for non-citizens implicates a reciprocal relationship between them and the body politic, and the interests of the polity help determine the contours of non-citizens' membership. Each of these frameworks has been shaped by the legal and political legacies of the civil rights movement itself, but the second formulation reveals how the pursuit of immigrant incorporation cannot be fully explained as a modern-day version of the civil rights struggle.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-678
Author(s):  
Shane Landers

The Fourth Amendment provides for the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Search warrants may only be issued upon a finding of probable cause. This core tenet of our constitutional republic becomes progressively flexible with every development in Fourth Amendment interpretation. In Peffer v. Stephens, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit delivered the latest blow to constitutional rights that restrict the State from engaging in unprincipled searches. In an issue of first impression, the Sixth Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s alleged use of a computer during the commission of a crime was adequate probable cause to justify a search of the defendant’s home and a seizure of the technological equipment inside. Such a shortsighted justification fails to consider technological innovation, economic policy, and historical civil liberties. Peffer v. Stephens is the latest proof of the parasitic relationship between the law and technological advancement. As technology evolves, the law struggles to keep pace and resultingly impedes economic development. With the exponential growth of technology in the 21st century, a visionary approach to search and seizure law is necessary to promote economic innovation and to refrain from further dismantling Fourth Amendment protections.


sjesr ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 204-210
Author(s):  
Dr. Syed Raza Shah Gilani ◽  
Hidayat Ur Rehman ◽  
Dr. Ilyas Khan

For the last few decades, the doctrine of proportionality has demonstrated and corroborated that it is the most effective legal standard used around Europe for the adjudication of constitutional rights. From its German origins, proportionality has migrated across jurisdictions and areas of law and has become one of the most successful legal transplants. However, there is some confusion as to whether there is any justification for the intervention of this in the UK's legal system, as the UK's legal system is based on common law, and did not welcome this doctrine very much. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the basic principles of this doctrine and check its compatibility with the common law system, which is based on democratic norms. To test the similarity, this article would also reflect on the underlying characteristics of the theory of proportionality and equate it with the standards of a democratic society. To begin with, this article first endeavors to analyze the legal sources of the doctrine of proportionality and then examines its affinity with the democratic norms of the common law system to investigate the compatibility level with each other in protecting the constitutional rights of the people.


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