APPENDIX Β: Sample of Public Interest Groups Used in the Study

Author(s):  
Julian E. Zelizer

This chapter examines how antecedent political events created a window of opportunity for campaign finance reformers during the period 1956–1974, including a series of scandals such as Watergate. In the 1960s, campaign finance reform emerged from a reform coalition composed of legislators, experts, philanthropists, foundations, and public interest groups. The coalition succeeded in placing campaign finance reform on the national agenda even without widespread public interest or support. It left intact most of the underlying pressures on campaign finance. For example, they did not tackle the declining importance of political parties, leaving high-cost television as the principal medium of political communication. The chapter highlights the tensions that arose over campaign finance that reached a boiling point when President Richard Nixon began his second term in office.


1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-540
Author(s):  
R. A. Young ◽  
Shirley M. Forsyth

AbstractThis article analyzes the internal communications between interest group leaders and their memberships. The case is Bill C-22, which increased patent protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada. The object was to test for differences between “material” groups seeking benefits for their members and “purposive” groups pursuing policies which will benefit others. Significant differences were found in the kinds of appeals made by group leaders. This implies that it can be realistic and useful to distinguish between types of group according to their purposes and the motivations of their members. The findings also provide some insight into the language of policy debates and allow some speculation about the perennial question of why people adhere to large public-interest groups.


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