1. The French Military Enlightenment

2018 ◽  
pp. 25-64
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Emilie d’Orgeix

The first French military engineers in the American colonies between 1635 and 1670 did not belong to a professional corps, being officers with expertise to do military land-surveying and construct emergency defences. Between 1670 and 1691 engineers were under the discipline of Vauban who chose them for missions in Canada or the French Antilles. After 1691, until 1776, they were all ingénieurs du roi. They ranged across citadel and fort construction, cartography and town planning (especially in Louisiana and Saint Domingue).They promoted the urban grid plan, as well as harbours and road construction. With incorporation in a royal Genie corps in 1776 they became much more strictly military.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-285
Author(s):  
Alan Mackintosh

AbstractUntil the beginning of the nineteenth century, registering and regulating the training of any medical practitioners in Britain had rarely been attempted, unlike in many other European countries. During the Revolutionary War with France, fevers swept through British armies, leading to numerous fatalities and crushing military defeats, especially in the disastrous expedition to St Domingo. The problem, as forcibly advocated by Robert Jackson, the leading expert on military fevers, seemed to be poor medical care due to both lack of compulsory medical training and the unsuitability of whatever training was available for army medical practitioners. With the simultaneous rapid advance of French military and civilian medical training and the threat of a French invasion, regulating British medical training and excluding the unqualified became a military necessity, and suddenly medical reform was receiving widespread attention. Emphasising the benefits to the Britain’s fighting ability, the reform effort, led by Edward Harrison, a very provincial Lincolnshire physician, under the patronage of Sir Joseph Banks, the President of the Royal Society, gained the support of leading politicians, including three Prime Ministers. For a short time, comprehensive medical reform seemed inevitable: but the opposition of the medical corporations, especially the London College of Physicians, could not be circumvented, and although Harrison persisted in his efforts for 6 years, no legislation was achieved. Nevertheless, within months, the Association of Apothecaries continued the process by pressing for a more limited reform, culminating in the 1815 Apothecaries Act. The long march towards the full regulation of doctors in Britain was started by the perceived military needs of the country during the war with France.


Author(s):  
С.А. Кириллина ◽  
Д.Р. Жантиев

В статье рассматриваются основные аспекты политики французского военного командования в отношении христианских общин Османского Египта и Османской Сирии во время экспедиции Бонапарта (1798–1801 гг.). Особое внимание уделено замыслам Бонапарта и его преемников на посту главнокомандующего по привлечению египетских и сирийских христиан к сотрудничеству с французской оккупационной администрацией в качестве чиновников и солдат вспомогательных военных отрядов. Также в статье рассматривается французская пропаганда в сопоставлении с практическими действиями в отношении египетских коптов и сирийских христиан наряду с ответной реакцией со стороны как христианских общин, так и мусульманского большинства населения Османского Египта и Османской Сирии. Выявлены противоречия и двойственность политики Бонапарта и его преемников на посту главнокомандующего Восточной армии – Клебера и Мену в отношении местных христиан. Французское командование рассматривало восточных христиан как потенциальных союзников, но в то же время не решалось выражать к ним особые симпатии, поскольку подобные действия могли вызвать возмущение среди мусульманского большинства населения и создать впечатление, что французы ведут религиозную войну против ислама и мусульман. В статье сделан вывод о том, что эта непоследовательность стала одной из причин неудачи египетской экспедиции Бонапарта, когда французская армия в ходе военных действий в Египте и Сирии оказалась отрезанной от Франции и в то же время не могла пополнять свои ряды добровольцами из числа местных жителей. The article examines the main aspects of the policy of the French military command in relation to the Christian communities of Ottoman Egypt and Ottoman Syria during the expedition of Bonaparte (1798–1801). Particular attention is paid to the plans of Bonaparte and his successors as commander-in-chief to attract Egyptian and Syrian Christians to cooperate with the French occupation administration as officials and soldiers of auxiliary military units. The article also examines French propaganda in comparison with practical actions towards Egyptian Copts and Syrian Christians, and the response from both Christian communities and the Muslim majority of the population of Ottoman Egypt and Ottoman Syria. The contradictions and ambiguity of the policy of Bonaparte and his successors as commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army – Kleber and Menou towards local Christians are revealed. The French command considered Eastern Christians as potential allies, but at the same time did not dare to express special sympathy for them, since such actions could cause outrage among the Muslim majority of the population and create the impression that the French are waging a religious war against Islam and Muslims. The article concludes that this inconsistency was one of the reasons for the failure of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, when the French army was cut off from France during the hostilities in Egypt and Syria and at the same time could not replenish its ranks with volunteers from among the local residents.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document