La Titolarizzazione Della Propriett Informale: Consensi E Critiche Del Pensiero Di Hernando De Soto (Land Titling and Informal Property Rights: Critique and Consensus of Hernando De Soto Theory)

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora Fontana
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-709 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON

AbstractLegal theorists and other commentators have long established a distinction between property and possession. According to this usage adopted here, possession refers to control of a resource, but property involves legally sanctioned rights. Strikingly, prominent foundational accounts of the ‘economics of property rights’ concentrate on possession, downplaying the issue of legitimate legal rights (Alchian, 1965, 1977; Barzel, 1994, 1997, 2002; von Mises, 1981). Some authors in this genre make a distinction between ‘economic rights’ and ‘legal rights’ where the former are more to do with possession or the capacity to control. They argue that ‘economic rights’ are primary and more relevant for understanding behaviour. But it is argued here that legal factors – involving recognition of authority and perceived justice or morality – have also to be brought into the picture to understand human motivation in modern societies, even in the economic sphere. As other authors including Hernando De Soto (2000) have pointed out, the neglect of the legal infrastructure that buttresses property has deleterious implications, including a failure to understand the role of property in supporting collateralized loans for innovation and economic development.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Cameron ◽  
◽  
Edward Whitney ◽  
Paul Winters ◽  
◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
CARRIE B. KEREKES ◽  
CLAUDIA R. WILLIAMSON

AbstractHernando de Soto attributes the poor economic performance of developing countries to insecure property rights. When property rights are not well-defined individuals do not have the incentives to invest in capital, and assets cannot be used as collateral, hindering capital formation and economic growth. This paper tests de Soto's hypothesis empirically by examining how the security of property rights impacts wealth, collateral, and capital formation across nations. Using several different measures and model specifications, we find support for de Soto's conjecture. Our results suggest that better defined property rights would result in substantial improvements in capital formation and economic growth in developing countries.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Newman ◽  
F. Tarp ◽  
K. van den Broeck
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-783 ◽  
Author(s):  
BENITO ARRUÑADA

AbstractThe contractual, single-exchange framework in Coase (1960) contains the implicit assumption that exchange in property rights does not affect future transaction (i.e., trading) costs. This is pertinent for analyzing use externalities but limits our understanding of property institutions: A central problem of property markets lies in the interaction among multiple transactions, which causes exchange-related and non-contractible externalities. By retaining a single-exchange simplification, the economic analysis of property has encouraged views that: overemphasize the initial allocation of property rights, while some form of recurrent allocation is often needed; pay scant attention to legal rights, although these determine enforceability and, therefore, economic value; and overestimate the power of unregulated private ordering, despite its inability to protect third parties. These three biases have been a misleading policy in many areas, including land titling and business firm formalization.


2010 ◽  
Vol 94 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 700-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Galiani ◽  
Ernesto Schargrodsky

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