scholarly journals The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Speech Act Analysis

John Searle has charged R.M. Hare's prescriptivist analysis of the meaning of ‘good,’ ‘ought’ and the other evaluative words with committing what he calls the ‘speech act fallacy.’ This is a fallacy which Searle thinks is committed not only by Hare's analysis, but by any analysis which attributes to a word the function of indicating that a particular speech act is being performed, or that an utterance has a particular illocutionary force. ‘There is a condition of adequacy which any analysis of the meaning of a word must meet,’ Searle writes, ‘and which the speech act analysis fails to meet. Any analysis of the meaning of a word must be consistent with the fact that the same word (or morpheme) can mean the same thing in all the different kinds of sentences in which it can occur.' Hare maintains that the word ‘good’ is used to indicate the speech act of prescribing. He maintains that one of the principal functions of this word is to indicate that utterances of sentences containing it have prescriptive illocutionary force, and that an analysis of its meaning must make explicit and ineliminable reference to this force-indicating function. But ‘good’ regularly occurs in sentences utterances of which appear to have no prescriptive illocutionary force.

Muḥammad’s Conversations with the Bedouin: a Speech-Act Analysis of Prophetic Discourse in Hadith

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Mohd Faizal Kasmani ◽  
Sofia Hayati Yusoff ◽  
Osama Kanaker
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
Communication Strategy ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Communication Style ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Perlocutionary Effect ◽  
Speech Act Analysis

Abstract Speech-act theory allows us to study how words have an impact in real life and the performative nature of words. At the same time, it can also contribute to an understanding of communication style and communication strategy. In this article, speech-act theory is applied to the conversations of Prophet Muḥammad with the Bedouin in two ways. First, the speech acts of the Prophet are analyzed using the categories put forward by John Searle to see how they function within the conversation. Second, the illocutionary force of an utterance and its perlocutionary effect – based on words and expressions that the Prophet used in his utterances – are examined to discover patterns in his communication strategy towards the Bedouin.

scholarly journals Pragmatic Forces in the Language of Two American Presidential Candidates

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Shilva Lioni
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Combination Method ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Presidential Debate

This article explains about pragmatic force that found in the language of two American presidential candidates in 2012 US Presidential Debate about foreign policy where the purpose on sharing a belief and influencing the other’s people view are appeared significantly in the utterances of two candidates. The pragmatic forces in this research are revealed by analyzing the illocutionary force that appeared and the reason of its performing related to the context of the utterance through pragmatics’ perspective, speech act. The result of analysis indicates that (i) four of five types of illocutionary forces were found and (ii) two of three reasons are used by the two American presidential candidates on the debate. The paper tries to highlight the pragmatic force that the speakers want to deliver where on this case was focused on sharing their belief in order to influence the other people’s (society and audiences) view. The paper also highlights some of the general considerations relating to the contexts of utterances. In analyzing the text, the writer used a combination method of quantitative and qualitative.

The semantics of modal verbs

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Boyd ◽  
J. P. Thorne
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Semantic Structure ◽  
Modal Verbs ◽  
The One ◽  
Complete Account ◽  
The Way

In this paper we propose an analysis of the semantic structure of modal sentences in English. Central to this analysis is the notion of ‘speech act’. The notion of speech act derives principally from the work of J. L. Austin (cf. especially Austin, 1962). Austin is particularly concerned with the use of sentences like I promise to go, I bet you sixpence and I name this ship ‘Queen Elizabeth’. One of his main purposes is to show that it is a mistake to class these sentences with sentences like John is running as statements. To utter the sentence I promise to go is not to make a statement about or to report some inner condition of mind or consciousness. It is to perform the act of promising, just as to say I bet you sixpence is to perform the act of betting. Indeed, in the case of these kinds of acts (promising, betting, naming, etc.) it is difficult to see how one could engage in them without using sentences of this kind. Austin calls verbs like promise, bet and name ‘performative’ verbs. It follows from this account that verbs like say, state and assert are also performative verbs. So that the mistake involved in classing I promise to go with John is running is not that in uttering the first sentence one is performing an act and in uttering the second one is not (ignoring the uninteresting fact that the act of vocalizing is common to both), but that the speaker is performing a different act in each case—in the one case promising and in the other stating. The fact that in the case of the utterance John is running the performative verb state does not occur, so that what Austin terms its ‘illocutionary force’ is not explicitly marked in the way in which the utterance I promise to go is explicitly marked as having the illocutionary force of a promise by the words I promise, while giving rise to certain difficult problems,2 does not affect Austin's main point, which is that a complete account of the meaning of a sentence cannot be restricted to semantic analyses as these are usually understood and that they must be extended to include information about the kind of speech act involved in uttering the sentence – that is, its illocutionary force.

Expressivism by Force

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Yalcin
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Dynamic Effect ◽  
The State ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Normative Language ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Characteristic Modes ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Levels

There is on the one hand the traditional speech act-theoretic notion of illocutionary force, and there is on the other hand the kind of notion of force we have in mind when we are theorizing in formal pragmatics about conversational states and their characteristic modes of update. These notions are different, and occur at different levels of abstraction.They are not helpfully viewed as in competition.The expressivist idea that normative language is distinctive in force can be developed in two sorts of directions, depending on which of the two senses of ’force’ is emphasized. I suggest expressivists do better to take the path stressing conversational update: they do better to start with the idea that normative discourse is distinctive in respect of its dynamic effect on the state of the conversation.

scholarly journals Teori Tindak Tutur dalam Studi Linguistik Pragmatik

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Akhmad Saifudin
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Field Of Study ◽  
Essential Condition ◽  
Illocutionary Acts ◽  
Present Information ◽  
Semantic Properties

This article explains the theory of speech acts proposed by John L. Austin and his student John R. Searle. Speech act theory is a sub-field of pragmatics. This field of study deals with the ways in which words can be used not only to present information but also to carry out actions. This theory considers three levels or components of speech: locutionary acts (the making of a meaningful statement, saying something that a hearer understands), illocutionary acts (saying something with a purpose, such as to inform), and perlocutionary acts (saying something that causes someone to act). Many view speech acts as the central units of communication, with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic properties of an utterance serving as ways of identifying the meaning of speaker’s utterance or illocutionary force. There are five types of Illocutionary point according to Searle: declarations, assertives, expressives, directives, and commissives (1979:viii). A speech act, in order to be successful, needs to be performed along certain types of conditions. These conditions were categorized by the linguist John Searle, who introduced the term felicity conditions: propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition.

Costruzioni ipotetiche parentetiche usate come marcatori di cortesia in latino tardo: il tipo si placet, si videtur, si molestum non est

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 477-488
Author(s):  
Chiara Fedriani
Keyword(s):  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
The Other ◽  
Stylistic Feature ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Topic Management

Summary:This paper looks at uses and pragmatic functions of five hypothetic clauses used parenthetically in Late Latin to soften the illocutionary force of potentially face-threatening acts such as orders and requests. Specifically, the data show that these politeness markers typically mitigate a very specific type of interactional move, i.e., meta-textual proposals with topic-management, turn-yielding, and discourseorganizational concerns. Moreover, the corpus-based study has revealed that they are found above all in Augustine’s philosophical dialogues. Evidence from earlier research has shown, on the other hand, that in Classical Latin si placet was used almost exclusively in Cicero’s philosophical dialogues: this suggests a process of imitation within a very specific discourse tradition, where these markers are perceived as a stylistic feature typical of urbane conversations among educated friends.

An Optative-Comparative Construction Expressing Emphatic Assertion in Classical Spanish

2020 ◽  
Vol 132 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-306
Author(s):  
Lorena Núñez Pinero
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Pragmatic Analysis ◽  
Comparative Construction

This paper offers a pragmatic analysis of a rarely used construction in Classical Spanish: an emphatic comparison of equality with optative illocution A comparative sentence such as Así me ayude Dios como fue buena mi intención (’May God help me just as my intention was good‘) is used for emphasizing the assertion fue buena mi intención (’my intention was good‘) This construction is probably a Latinism It occurs in Latin, especially in Plautus and Terence, and is mostly attested in Spanish in humanistic comedy and in the Celestinesque tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries The first member of the construction is interpreted at the pragmatic level as a reinforcer of the illocutionary force of the comparative construction as a whole, which expresses an indirect assertive speech act Speakers perform this type of act by satisfying its sincerity condition: they believe that the event of the second member is true, because if it were not, they would run a risk, i.e. the optative would entail a curse for themselves By contrast, when the event is true, the optative entails a good wish for themselves This paper also analyzes how the pragmatic properties of the construction are reflected in its semantic and morphosyntactic properties

Speech Acts in Discourse Context

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craige Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Semantic Type ◽  
Discourse Context ◽  
Semantics And Pragmatics ◽  
Consensus View ◽  
Grammatical Mood ◽  
The Relationship

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.

Force and Conversational States

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah E. Murray ◽  
William B. Starr
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Semantic Type ◽  
Grammatical Mood

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to serving as a particular type of speech act, that is, to serving as one of the three basic types of language game moves-making an assertion (declarative); posing a question (interrogative); or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). This type of semantics for grammatical mood is illustrated with the imperative.

Sentence mood

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Portner
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Speech Act Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Major Topic

Sentence mood is the linguistic category which marks the fundamental conversational function, or “sentential force,” of a sentence. Exemplified by the universal types of declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences (as well as by less-common types), sentence mood has been a major topic of research in both linguistics and philosophy. This chapter identifies the two main theories which address the topic, one based on speech act theory and the other on dynamic approaches to meaning. It explains and evaluates current research which uses the two theories, and identifies the most important insights which come out of each.

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