5 Theories of Truth & Meaning

2021 ◽  
pp. 173-216
Keyword(s):  
Theories Of Truth

Reprise

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Pietroski
Keyword(s):  
Modern Logic ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

This chapter summarizes the main themes. Humans naturally acquire generative procedures that connect meanings with pronunciations. These meanings are neither concepts nor extensions. Meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. In particular, phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build monadic (i.e., predicative) concepts that are massively conjunctive. Theories of meaning should not be confused with theories of truth. Lexicalization is a process of introducing concepts that can be combined via simple operations whose inputs must be monadic or dyadic. In theorizing about meanings, we can and should eschew much of the powerful typology and combinatorial operations that the founders of modern logic introduced for very different purposes.

The Less Said The Better: Dewey, Neurath, and Mid-Century Theories of Truth

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Capps
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract John Dewey’s theory of truth is widely viewed as proposing to substitute “warranted assertibility” for “truth,” a proposal that has faced serious objections since the late 1930s. By examining Dewey’s theory in its historical context – and, in particular, by drawing parallels with Otto Neurath’s concurrent attempts to develop a non-correspondence, non-formal theory of truth – I aim to shed light on Dewey’s underlying objectives. Dewey and Neurath were well-known to each other and, as their writing and correspondence make clear, they took similar paths over the mid-century philosophical terrain. I conclude that Dewey’s account of truth is more principled, and more relevant to historical debates, than it first appears.

A deflationist theory of intentionality?

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Sebastian Knell
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Specific Role ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Attitude Ascription ◽  
Attitude Ascriptions ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
De Re ◽  
The Third ◽  
Short Summary

The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom’s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom’s analysis of attitude-ascription, focusing on his account of the grammar of de re ascriptions of belief. The third section discusses in detail those aspects of his account from which a deflationist conception of intentionality may be derived, or which at least permit such a conception. In the proposed interpretation of Brandom’s analysis, the vocabulary expressing the representational directedness of thought and talk does not describe a genuine property of mental states, but has an alternative descriptive function and in addition contains a performative and a meta­descriptive element.

Truth and the Sciences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anjan Chakravartty
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Sociological Approaches

Conceptions of truth in relation to the sciences vary extensively along two dimensions. The first concerns the applicability of the notion of truth to scientific knowledge, resulting in a number of contentions regarding the relevance or importance of truth in this context. The second dimension concerns the particular theory of truth one might think applicable, and here one finds a variety of preferences, including: truth as coherence, especially suited to historicist and sociological approaches to science; truth as utility, described by pragmatist approaches to science; and truth via correspondence or truth-making, especially in the context of various forms of “realism” in connection with scientific knowledge. This chapter travels along the first dimension in the direction of increasing commitment to the applicability of truth, and in each case explores the second dimension: how different views of scientific knowledge appeal, explicitly or implicitly, to different theories of truth.

Some remarks on Indian theories of truth

1984 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
KisorKumar Chakrabarti
Keyword(s):  
Theories Of Truth

scholarly journals INFINITARY TABLEAU FOR SEMANTIC TRUTH

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOBY MEADOWS
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Direct Proof ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Easy Method ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Image Position

AbstractWe provide infinitary proof theories for three common semantic theories of truth: strong Kleene, van Fraassen supervaluation and Cantini supervaluation. The value of these systems is that they provide an easy method of proving simple facts about semantic theories. Moreover we shall show that they also give us a simpler understanding of the computational complexity of these definitions and provide a direct proof that the closure ordinal for Kripke’s definition is $\omega _1^{CK}$. This work can be understood as an effort to provide a proof-theoretic counterpart to Welch’s game-theoretic (Welch, 2009).

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