Pragmatism and the Importance of Truth

This paper develops a position I call “apathetic pragmatism.” Apathetic pragmatism is a form of pragmatism that, through advocating “apathy” about the topic of truth, avoids the troubled identification of utility and truth found in classical and neo pragmatist theories of truth. Initially explored by Stephen Stich, I argue Stich’s case for apathetic pragmatism relies upon a theory of truth that causes vicious circularity. I then pursue a different route to apathetic pragmatism, one that sees apathetic pragmatism as a “paradigm shift” in relation to previous forms of pragmatism. It is a paradigm shift where pragmatism becomes a normative view concerning the questions that are necessary to ask, not an attempt to answer questions assumed necessary.

Approaching probabilistic and deterministic nomic truths in an inductive probabilistic way

Theories of truth approximation in terms of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) almost always deal with (non-probabilistically) approaching deterministic truths, either actual or nomic. This paper deals first with approaching a probabilistic nomic truth, viz. a true probability distribution. It assumes a multinomial probabilistic context, hence with a lawlike true, but usually unknown, probability distribution. We will first show that this true multinomial distribution can be approached by Carnapian inductive probabilities. Next we will deal with the corresponding deterministic nomic truth, that is, the set of conceptually possible outcomes with a positive true probability. We will introduce Hintikkian inductive probabilities, based on a prior distribution over the relevant deterministic nomic theories and on conditional Carnapian inductive probabilities, and first show that they enable again probabilistic approximation of the true distribution. Finally, we will show, in terms of a kind of success theorem, based on Niiniluoto’s estimated distance from the truth, in what sense Hintikkian inductive probabilities enable the probabilistic approximation of the relevant deterministic nomic truth. In sum, the (realist) truth approximation perspective on Carnapian and Hintikkian inductive probabilities leads to the unification of the inductive probability field and the field of truth approximation.

On the Costs of Classical Logic

This article compares classical (or -like) and nonclassical (or -like) axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics developed by Kripke (J Philos 72(19): 690–716, 1975). Following the line of investigation of Halbach and Nicolai (J Philos Logic 47(2): 227–257, 2018), we do not compare and qua theories of truth simpliciter, but rather qua axiomatisations of the Kripkean conception of truth. We strengthen the central results of Halbach and Nicolai (2018) and Nicolai (Stud Log 106(1): 101–130, 2018), showing that, on the one hand, there is a stronger sense in which some variants of and some variants of can be taken to be, truth-theoretically, equivalent. On the other hand, we show that this truth-theoretical equivalence is not preserved by some other variants of and , arguing that the variants are more adequate axiomatisations of the fixed-point semantics than the corresponding variants.

Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability

The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true iff it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by Van Cleve (1996) and Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally/informally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth (theories that identify truth with bare warranted assertability) are widely acknowledged to be. Sustained analysis reveals that the unrestricted formal/informal legitimacy argument is firmly grounded in first-person conceivability/possibility evidence.

Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability

The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true iff it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by Van Cleve (1996) and Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally/informally illegitimate in a similar sense that unsophisticated epistemic theories of truth (theories that identify truth with bare warranted assertability) are widely acknowledged to be. Sustained analysis reveals that the unrestricted formal/informal legitimacy argument is firmly grounded in first-person conceivability/possibility evidence.

The Less Said The Better: Dewey, Neurath, and Mid-Century Theories of Truth

John Dewey’s theory of truth is widely viewed as proposing to substitute “warranted assertibility” for “truth,” a proposal that has faced serious objections since the late 1930s. By examining Dewey’s theory in its historical context – and, in particular, by drawing parallels with Otto Neurath’s concurrent attempts to develop a non-correspondence, non-formal theory of truth – I aim to shed light on Dewey’s underlying objectives. Dewey and Neurath were well-known to each other and, as their writing and correspondence make clear, they took similar paths over the mid-century philosophical terrain. I conclude that Dewey’s account of truth is more principled, and more relevant to historical debates, than it first appears.

Nicholas of Autrecourt: A Forerunner of Paraconsistent Logics

We suggest that the 14th century scholar Nicholas of Autrecourt can be regarded as a precursor of the paraconsistent logics developed around 1950. We show how the Sorbonne licentiatus in theology provided in his few extant writings a refutation of both the principle of explosion and the law of non-contradiction, in accordance with the tenets of paraconsistent logics. This paves the way to the most advanced theories of truth in natural language and quantum dynamics.