IV. The Object Theory Intentionality of Ontological Commitment

2012 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Object Theory

scholarly journals Quantum ontology without speculation

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Egg
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Hard Case ◽  
Quantum Ontology

AbstractExisting proposals concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics (QM) either involve speculation that goes beyond the scientific evidence or abandon realism about large parts of QM. This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, by showing that QM as it is formulated in standard textbooks allows for a much more substantive ontological commitment than is usually acknowledged. For this purpose, I defend a non-fundamentalist approach to ontology, which is then applied to various aspects of QM. In particular, I will defend realism about spin, which has been viewed as a particularly hard case for the ontology of QM.

scholarly journals A radical relationist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Marchesi
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Intentional Content

AbstractThe problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the existence of their relata are wanting. In this regard, I defend a kind of pluralism about relations according to which more than one kind of relation involves non-existents. Second, I contend that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. More accurately, I contend that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the intentional content solution (as developed by Crane) and the adverbial property solution (as developed by Kriegel). Finally, I argue that once the distinction between thinking “X” and thinking about X has been drawn, the radical relationist solution can handle issues like ontological commitment, substitutivity failure, scrutability, and non-specificity.

THE ROLE OF PLANS IN THE FORMATION OF A NEW INNOVATION PRACTICE: AN INNOVATION OBJECT PERSPECTIVE

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950031
Author(s):  
SIW M. FOSSTENLØKKEN
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Current Practice ◽  
Temporal Dynamics ◽  
Ethnographic Study ◽  
Innovation Theory ◽  
Object Theory ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Practice Development ◽  
Future Practice

This paper explores the role of plans, as objects, in the formation of new innovation practice in organisations. A vocabulary for analysis is developed from innovation object theory. First, findings from an ethnographic study in a hospital organisation show that a plan serves several functions depending on its activation for use: a checklist of past practice (tertiary object), an opener for debates over current practice (secondary object) and a trigger for future practice development (primary object). Second, a framework is offered that shows how a plan supports different functionalities (evaluating, debating, further exploring) in a temporal dynamics of practice formation. Third, thus, plans play a significant role not only in planning activities, but also as connectors that shape and patch together pieces of past, present and future into what actually become new organisational practice. Finally, implications for innovation theory and management are drawn from these novel contributions.

scholarly journals On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification

2021 ◽  
pp. 150-173
Author(s):  
Salvatore Florio ◽  
Øystein Linnebo
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment ◽  
Plural Logic ◽  
Plural Quantification ◽  
Plural Reference

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. Both assumptions are problematic, as is shown by providing a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic that does not resort to sets but takes a plural term to have plural reference. This semantics gives rise to a generalized notion of ontological commitment, which is used to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic.

scholarly journals How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michela Summa
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Literary Works ◽  
Object Theory ◽  
Fictional Objects ◽  
Complex Dependence ◽  
Imaginary Object ◽  
Abstract Artifacts

AbstractAccording to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.

Consolidating SNOMED CT's ontological commitment

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Schulz ◽  
Ronald Cornet ◽  
Kent Spackman
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Commitment
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