Commitment Without Consequences. A Carnapian Approach to Fictional Objects and Negative Existence Statements

<p>The overall aim of this thesis is to present a fresh perspective on three closely related areas of enquiry: Descriptivist theories of reference, Direct Reference theories and the Carnapian approach to questions of existence and identity. This perspective is developed and tested by a critical analysis of the work of a leading Carnapian theorist, Amie Thomasson, and by looking at some of the central problems associated with our talk of fictional objects. It concludes in an account of negative existence statements and fictional objects as possibly existing objects. In Chapter one I set out the key elements of Carnap’s approach, as that approach was developed over time and in dialogue with his colleague Quine. In Chapter two I explore the relation between the previously mentioned three areas of enquiry through an examination of Amie Thomasson’s brand of Carnapian meta-ontology. In Chapters four and five I develop the view that fictional objects are objects that meet the criteria of existence and identity of at least one linguistic framework but fail to meet the criteria of another, preferred framework. This provides the basis for a neo-Carnapian account of fictional objects in terms of the relations between linguistic frameworks, a novel approach to the questions surrounding such objects. In chapter five, the concluding chapter of the thesis, I further develop my explanation of how there can be truths about fictional and non-existent objects by giving an ontological version of John MacFarlane’s relativity principle. This paves the way for a neo-Carnapian analysis of true negative existence statements. Here I integrate the story I have told about fictional objects and the relations between linguistic frameworks with theories of reference and meaning. In particular, I incorporate a satisfactory concept of the rigid designation of ordinary proper names (and, potentially, of natural and artefactual kind terms). This then leads on to an explanation of how fictional objects, contra Kripke and many others, may reasonably said to be possible objects that, though they don’t exist, might exist under different circumstances.</p>

Commitment Without Consequences. A Carnapian Approach to Fictional Objects and Negative Existence Statements

<p>The overall aim of this thesis is to present a fresh perspective on three closely related areas of enquiry: Descriptivist theories of reference, Direct Reference theories and the Carnapian approach to questions of existence and identity. This perspective is developed and tested by a critical analysis of the work of a leading Carnapian theorist, Amie Thomasson, and by looking at some of the central problems associated with our talk of fictional objects. It concludes in an account of negative existence statements and fictional objects as possibly existing objects. In Chapter one I set out the key elements of Carnap’s approach, as that approach was developed over time and in dialogue with his colleague Quine. In Chapter two I explore the relation between the previously mentioned three areas of enquiry through an examination of Amie Thomasson’s brand of Carnapian meta-ontology. In Chapters four and five I develop the view that fictional objects are objects that meet the criteria of existence and identity of at least one linguistic framework but fail to meet the criteria of another, preferred framework. This provides the basis for a neo-Carnapian account of fictional objects in terms of the relations between linguistic frameworks, a novel approach to the questions surrounding such objects. In chapter five, the concluding chapter of the thesis, I further develop my explanation of how there can be truths about fictional and non-existent objects by giving an ontological version of John MacFarlane’s relativity principle. This paves the way for a neo-Carnapian analysis of true negative existence statements. Here I integrate the story I have told about fictional objects and the relations between linguistic frameworks with theories of reference and meaning. In particular, I incorporate a satisfactory concept of the rigid designation of ordinary proper names (and, potentially, of natural and artefactual kind terms). This then leads on to an explanation of how fictional objects, contra Kripke and many others, may reasonably said to be possible objects that, though they don’t exist, might exist under different circumstances.</p>

The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects

<p>Realism about Fictional Objects is a view that is committed to the existence of fictional objects. In this thesis, I defend a view in the fictional realist tradition called the Artefactual Theory of Objects, and argue that this view provides the best explanation of fictional data. This is done in the following order. First, I evaluate and argue against alternative realist and anti-realist views that purport to explain fictional data better than the Artefactual Theory of Objects. Second, I show how semantic theories cannot aid in the success of alternative views or succeed by themselves. Third and last, I show how the Artefactual Theory of Objects is capable of overcoming the metaphysical problems raised against it.</p>

The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects

<p>Realism about Fictional Objects is a view that is committed to the existence of fictional objects. In this thesis, I defend a view in the fictional realist tradition called the Artefactual Theory of Objects, and argue that this view provides the best explanation of fictional data. This is done in the following order. First, I evaluate and argue against alternative realist and anti-realist views that purport to explain fictional data better than the Artefactual Theory of Objects. Second, I show how semantic theories cannot aid in the success of alternative views or succeed by themselves. Third and last, I show how the Artefactual Theory of Objects is capable of overcoming the metaphysical problems raised against it.</p>

How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’

According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.

Iconic Fictional Object as Separately Copyrighted Work from the Original Work

Copyright is one of the IPR branches that protect the human’s intellectual work in the field of science, arts, and literature. The film is a creation that is protected by copyright. In a film, there are not only characters that are easy to remember but also specific properties uniquely used by the characters, especially the main character. This property is called an iconic fictional object. This normative juridical legal research will discuss one legal issue, whether an iconic fictional object can be separately protected from the original work. Based on the analysis in this study, an iconic-fictional object is not explicitly stated as work protected by copyright according to Article 40 of Copyright Law No. 28 of 2014. However, iconic fictional objects fulfil elements of a work entitled to copyright protection: The creative work in the fields of science, art, and literature; Created by the ability, skill or expertise of the creator; and Expressed in real form. Furthermore, The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on DC Comics vs Mark Towle Batmobile case had argued that iconic fictional objects could be separately protected from the original work as long as they meet three conditions: (1) Physical as well as conceptual qualities, (2) Sufficiently delineated, and (3) Especially distinctive and contain some unique elements of expression.

Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being

Ontological pluralism is the view that there is more than one fundamental way of being. This paper sketches ontological pluralism about non-being, the idea that non-being can be further divided into more fundamental categories. After drawing out the relationship between pluralism about being and pluralism about non-being, I discuss quantificational strategies for the pluralist about non-being. I examine historical precedent for the view. Finally, I suggest that pluralism about non-being has explanatory power across a variety of domains, and that the view can account for differences between non-existent past and future times, between omissions and absences, and between different kinds of fictional objects.

Exploring Fictional Truth

There are ghosts. At least, in "Hamlet" there are. This is an example of a fictional truth, of something true in a fiction. Or so it seems. For, once we broaden our view to all kinds and realms of fiction our ordinary notions are challenged, and intriguing philosophical questions arise. Are there really any fictional truths? How can they be determined? Is everything just interpretation? Can anything be fictional? Could you be part of a fiction? Et cetera. The philosophical literature on fiction typically focusses on the semantics of fictional discourse and the ontology of fictional objects. In contrast, this study explores the nature of fictional truth by analyzing its conceptual structure and by unfolding some of its most important conceptual connections. After reviewing the field and identifying core elements that any theory of fictional truth must accommodate Christian Folde investigates several interrelated issues central to the on-going debates. Building on a clear account of fictional content and a wealth of examples the author offers novel solutions to various problems at the intersection of fictional truth, interpretation, and narration. The book thereby makes contributions to aesthetics, metaphysics and literary theory, among other things, and is thus both of philosophical and interdisciplinary value.

Logik-Skript 2

Modal logic deals with inferences and arguments involving the notions of possibility and necessity. This introduction to the semantics and syntax of modal junction and quantifier logic explains the foundations of the theory of possible worlds and provides a calculus of natural reasoning for modal logic proof. It also discusses important philosophical applications of modal logic, as well as issues concerning the existence of possible, necessary, and fictional objects. The book lends itself to either self-study or as a textbook for a basic modal logic course in BA or MA philosophy courses. It is aimed primarily at those who already have an elementary knowledge of logic and wish to deepen it in an important area of philosophical logic.

Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act

Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Stecker in Br J Aesthet 51(3):295–308, 2011) The claim is supposed to be supported among others by ‘the argument from action.’ In contrast to genuine emotions, proponents of this argument claim, fictional emotions do not motivate their bearers to act. (cf. Yanal in Paradoxes of emotion and fiction, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1999; Lamarque in Br J Aesthet 21(4):291–304, 1981; Carroll in The philosophy of horror: or, paradoxes of the heart, Routledge, London, 1990; Currie 1990; Walton 1978, 1990; Suits in Pac Philos Q 87(3):369–386, 2006; Friend, in: Kind (ed.) The Routledge handbook of philosophy of imagination, Routledge, New York, 2016) This claim grounds in what may appear to be an obvious fact: that viewers and readers of are not led to act by their fictional emotions. It is certainly true that viewers and readers of fiction do not form intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional entities. In contrast to the proponents of the argument from action, I will argue that the lack of any such intentions can be explained only with reference to intending’s doxastic conditions, conditions that are unsatisfied in the fictional scenario. Decisively, this explanation does not refer to the motivational force of the agent’s emotions; indeed, it doesn’t refer to emotions at all. Thus, the lack of intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional objects provides no support for the claim that fictional emotions are no genuine emotions.