Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts

1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Celano
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Irreducible Form ◽  
Institutional Reality ◽  
Relevant Community

AbstractJ. R. Searle’s general theory of social and institutional reality, as deployed in some of his recent work (The Construction of Social Reality, 1995; Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society, 1998}, raises many deep and interesting problems. Four issues are taken up here: (1) Searle’s claim to the effect that collective intentionality is a primitive, irreducible form of intentionality; (2) his account of one of the most puzzling features of institutional concepts, their having a self-referential component; (3) the question as to the point, or points, of having institutions; (4) Searle's claim to the effect that false beliefs on the part of the members of the relevant community are compatible with the existence of related institutional facts. It is argued that, under all four respects, Searle's theory proves to be hardly satisfactory.

A Critique of Searle’s Linguistic Exceptionalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 004839312199558
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Lobo
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Institutional Facts

John Searle’s social ontology distinguishes between linguistic and non-linguistic institutional facts. He argues that every instance of the latter is created by declarative speech acts, while the former are exceptions to this far-reaching claim: linguistic phenomena are autonomous, their meaning is “built in,” and this is necessary, Searle argues, to avoid “infinite regress.” In this essay I analyze Searle’s arguments for this linguistic exceptionalism and reveal its flaws. My method is to follow Searle’s argument closely and comprehensively so as to avoid, insofar as is possible, a selective reading of his argument in my favor. Against Searle’s position, I argue that linguistic phenomena are not exceptions to his general theory of institutional facts, for they too always require supplementary representations in order to exist. Language itself is analogous to all other institutions and infinite regress turns out to be unavoidable.

scholarly journals Searle's conception of institutional reality

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-198
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Theory ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Human Interaction ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Institutional Reality ◽  
Rationality Assumption

This paper aims to present Searle's conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstanding, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into account the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previous one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle's theory of institutional reality.

John Searle’s Social Ontology

1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eerik Lagerspetz
Keyword(s):  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Institutional Facts

AbstractThe theory presented in John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality has a lot in common with the conventionalist view of institutions. Conventionalism, however, can explain how there can be institutional facts without pre-existing rules, and why people comply with institutional rules.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

Constructivist Moral Realism

1998 ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
J. K. Swindler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Social World ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Realm

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

Days of post-pandemic future: re-imagining corruption practices in a world that won’t stop changing

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendi Yogi Prabowo
Keyword(s):  
Practice Theory ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Safety Net ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Multiple Perspectives ◽  
Content Type ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
The Social

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to propose a new analytical framework in examining corruption from the social ontology perspective by using the Schatzkian practice theory to assess the interconnectedness among social practices constituting the social reality. Design/methodology/approach This exploratory paper is part of the author’s study to assess the complex corruption phenomenon in Indonesia from multiple perspectives to gain a better understanding of its nature and dynamics. By drawing from the existing literature on the Schatzkian practice theory, the COVID-19 pandemic and the corruption phenomenon, this study investigates the potential changes of the new constellation of practice-arrangement bundles within the social reality and how such changes may alter corruption practices in the future. Furthermore, this study also uses publicly available reports from several national and international agencies to explore possible future scenarios from the interconnectedness of corruption, anti-corruption and pandemic practices. This paper constructs a new analytical framework for assessing the corruption phenomenon and designing the most appropriate anti-corruption strategy from such an exploration. The framework also serves as a reference for future anti-corruption research. Findings The author establishes that all social phenomena are constructed by an interconnected, dynamic and ever-changing constellation of practice-arrangement bundles within the social reality. As a largely social phenomenon (at least in Indonesia), corruption is also constructed by webs of practice-arrangement bundles. For decades, corruption practices in Indonesia have always been interconnected with anti-corruption practices in ways that changes in one group of practices will drive changes in the others. With the adoption of the pandemic practices centered around social distancing, social restriction and social safety net, corruption practices appear to transform to adapt to the new environment. Therefore, future anti-corruption research should aim to examine the structure and dynamics of corruption, anti-corruption and pandemic practices to highlight changes or potential changes within the three groups of practices to determine the most appropriate intervention measures and anti-corruption strategy. Research limitations/implications This exploratory study is self-funded and relies primarily on documentary analysis to explore the corruption phenomenon in Indonesia. Future studies will benefit from in-depth interviews with former corruption offenders and corruption investigators. Practical implications This exploratory paper contributes to developing a sound corruption prevention strategy by proposing a new analytical framework for assessing various social practices, particularly those associated with corruption and the COVID-19 pandemic. Originality/value This paper highlights the importance of understanding the structure, interconnectedness and dynamics of social practices, particularly associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, to better understand the corruption phenomenon.

WHAT IS MONEY? AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEARLE'S INSTITUTIONAL FACTS

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Smit ◽  
Filip Buekens ◽  
Stan du Plessis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Natural Objects ◽  
Existent Problem

In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem.

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