WHAT IS MONEY? AN ALTERNATIVE TO SEARLE'S INSTITUTIONAL FACTS

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Smit ◽  
Filip Buekens ◽  
Stan du Plessis
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Natural Objects ◽  
Existent Problem

In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem.

scholarly journals The Contract of Language: John Searle's Philosophy of Society

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
Michiel Leezenberg
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Social World ◽  
Language Usage ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
The Social

AbstractIn Making the Social World, John Searle develops what he calls a "philosophy of society", which explores the ontological status and logical structure of institutional facts like universities and baseball games. This philosophy of society crucially depends on Searle's earlier work in the philosophy of language and mind. In this review, I discuss some aspects of Searle's theory of institutional facts as structured in terms of declaratives that are most relevant to working linguists, like the relation of language to other social institutions, the emergence of normativity in language, the articulation of (legitimate and illegitimate) power in language usage, and the question of whether there should be any restrictions on the allegedly universal human right to free speech.

scholarly journals Nations in the bubble of social reality: language and all that

2016 ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kamusella
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Human Evolution ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Primary Function ◽  
Material Reality ◽  
The Universe

Nations in the bubble of social reality: language and all that In the last century and a half scholars from different disciplines began to distinguish between material reality (the universe), the biosphere, and social reality (the semiosphere), as three important heuristic categories. In the latter half of the 20th century, the philosophers John L. Austin and John Searle proposed that language and its use enable humans to generate social reality. They also analyzed the mechanisms of the process. From another perspective, the evolutionary anthropologist Robin Dunbar offered an explanation of how language was selected in the process of human evolution, and argued that its primary function is group-building, that is, the generation of social cohesion. Drawing on these insights, the article proposes that the dilemma of whether nations exist objectively or are subjective entities can be resolved by analyzing this problem in the light of Searle’s distinction between ontological objectivity / subjectivity and epistemic objectivity / subjectivity. Narody w koronie rzeczywistości społecznej widziane z perspektywy językaOd półtora stulecia badacze z zakresu różnych dyscyplin zaczęli wyraźnie rozróżniać pomiędzy rzeczywistością materialną (tj. wszechświatem, ogółem bytów materialnych), biosferą oraz rzeczywistością społeczną (semiosferą), jako powiązanymi ze sobą trzema kategoriami analizy heurystycznej. W drugiej połowie XX stulecia filozofowie języka John L. Austin i John Searle dali tezę, iż to język oraz jego użycie pozwala ludziom generować rzeczywistość społeczną. Obydwaj również badali mechanizmy rządzące tym procesem generacji. Z kolei psycholog ewolucyjny Robin Dunbar przedstawił model wyjaśniający, jak język (tzn. biologiczna zdolność językowa) został wyselekcjonowany w procesie ewolucji. Na tej podstawie postawił on tezę, iż prymarną funkcją języka jest umożliwianie budowania grup ludzkich, czyli innymi słowy, generowanie potrzebnej ku temu spójności społecznej. Korzystając z powyżej wymienionych ustaleń, artykuł proponuje nowe podejście do szeroko dyskutowanej kwestii czy narody istnieją obiektywnie lub są subiektywnymi bytami, analizując to zagadnienie w świetle zaproponowanego przez J. Searle’a rozróżnienia pomiędzy ontyczną obiektywnością/subiektywnością a epistemiczną obiektywnością/subiektywnością.

scholarly journals On the Difference of the Approaches of Searle and Durkheim to the Description of Social Reality

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-198
Author(s):  
A. A. Sanzhenakov
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Emile Durkheim ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Common Features ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Understanding Of Science ◽  
The Individual

The article is devoted to the comparison of the social ontology of John Searle with the social theory of Emile Durkheim. It was shown that the approaches of Searle and Durkheim have a number of similar features. These common features are the rejection of reductionism of the collective to the individual, attention to language as one of the most important conditions of the emergence of social reality, the recognition of unawareness and automatism in accepting the rules of social interaction by its participants. However, there are certainly differences between the conceptions of Searle and Durkheim, and therefore the possibility of influence of analytic philosophy represented by Searle on social theory is obvious. As the basis from which this discrepancy arises, the author points to the understanding of science and the level of objectivity of scientific research that have changed since by the time of Searle.

scholarly journals The legitimacy of increasing marginal utility in social services: The case of university examinations

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (186) ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Petar Filipic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Services ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Marginal Utility ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Diminishing Marginal Utility ◽  
The Law

The concept of utility became rightfully recognized in economic theory with the introduction of decreasing marginal utility. However a question that arises is: does an increasing consumption of goods always and without exception lead to diminishing marginal utility? It is quite possible that in some cases marginal utility of goods and services actually increases. If this fact is true, it might additionally strengthen the utility theory and make it applicable in numerous cases of economic and social reality. This paper uses the example of the utility of studying at university (i.e. the utility of university examinations), and tries to add a few arguments in favour of the statement that the law of increasing utility exists.

scholarly journals The creation of institutional reality, special theory of relativity, and mere Cambridge change

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg
Keyword(s):  
Special Theory ◽  
Propositional Content ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Special Theory Of Relativity ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Institutional Reality ◽  
Cambridge Change

Abstract Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit” (i.e. a world-to-word and a word-to-world direction of fit), synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special theory of relativity—irrespective of whether the account is interpreted as involving causal generation or non-causal grounding of worldly institutional facts—and should be replaced by a more modest theory which interprets the results of Status Function Declarations in terms of mere Cambridge change and institutional truth. I end the paper by indicating the import of this more modest theory for theorizing about the causal potency of institutional phenomena generated by declarations.

scholarly journals Comment on John Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality

1998 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Waldenfels
Keyword(s):  
Social Reality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Natural Processes ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis comment deals with some basic elements Searle uses in order to construct social reality, i.e. togetherness, we-intentionality and the distinction between institutional and brute facts. The commentator argues that Searle’s theory tends to a partial biologism because lacking a sufficient concept of embodiment. Consequently ‘pre-institutional facts’ such as eating, copulating, working or torturing are systematically underdetermined. On the deontic level the theory relies on natural processes of conventional power. So the distinction between factual acceptance and acceptability is blurred by a sort of conformism, and one neglects the status of dissidents and victims whose belonging to the predominant ‘we’ remains highly dubious.

Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts

1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Celano
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Irreducible Form ◽  
Institutional Reality ◽  
Relevant Community

AbstractJ. R. Searle’s general theory of social and institutional reality, as deployed in some of his recent work (The Construction of Social Reality, 1995; Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society, 1998}, raises many deep and interesting problems. Four issues are taken up here: (1) Searle’s claim to the effect that collective intentionality is a primitive, irreducible form of intentionality; (2) his account of one of the most puzzling features of institutional concepts, their having a self-referential component; (3) the question as to the point, or points, of having institutions; (4) Searle's claim to the effect that false beliefs on the part of the members of the relevant community are compatible with the existence of related institutional facts. It is argued that, under all four respects, Searle's theory proves to be hardly satisfactory.

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