Volkswagen: the State of Affairs of Golden Shares, General Company Law and European Free Movement of Capital – A discussion of Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany of 23.10.2007 –

Author(s):  
Gert-Jan Vossestein
2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 378-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolf-Georg Ringe

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate SJÅFJELL

AbstractThis article discusses three questions. First, what drives business to ignore human rights, or even worse, consciously undermine the achievement of human rights? Second, given the state of affairs of business and human rights, why is there not a quick regulatory fix to the problems that we see? Third, in light of the failure of business and of regulation so far, what can be done? The article posits that reform of company law is key to ensuring business respect for human rights, as an intrinsic element of the transition to sustainability. The article outlines how company law can facilitate sustainable business. It concludes with some reflections on the drivers for change that make it possible to envisage that the necessary reform of company law will be enacted.


2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Savkovic

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the potential of certain acta jure gestionis to restrict the free movement of capital by way of establishing so-called “golden shares” (i.e., special rights). To that end, a Montenegrin case study is used, since it displays that a privatization contract and the subsequent shareholder’s agreement – typically jure gestionis acts – may be utilized to perpetuate a state’s influence over a privatized company in a manner equally efficient as that of certain jure imperii acts, which were found by the cjeu to represent impermissible restrictions on the free movement of capital. Finally, in view of the Montenegrin case study and the examined case law, arguments are offered and the conclusion is made that the cjeu should essentially adopt the same approach with regard to each of the two types of legal instruments utilized by states to secure their influence over privatized companies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-162
Author(s):  
Jeremy W. Skrzypek

It is often suggested that, since the state of affairs in which God creates a good universe is better than the state of affairs in which He creates nothing, a perfectly good God would have to create that good universe. Making use of recent work by Christine Korgaard on the relational nature of the good, I argue that the state of affairs in which God creates is actually not better, due to the fact that it is not better for anyone or anything in particular. Hence, even a perfectly good God would not be compelled to create a good universe.


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