Abstract
In this paper, we show how to construct – from any linear code – a Proof of Retrievability (
{\mathsf{PoR}}
) which features very low computation complexity on both the client (
{\mathsf{Verifier}}
) and the server (
{\mathsf{Prover}}
) sides, as well as small client storage (typically 512 bits).
We adapt the security model initiated
by Juels and Kaliski
[PoRs: Proofs of retrievability for large files,
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security—CCS 2007,
ACM, New York 2007, 584–597]
to fit into the framework
of Paterson, Stinson and Upadhyay
[A coding theory foundation for the analysis of general unconditionally secure proof-of-retrievability schemes for cloud storage,
J. Math. Cryptol. 7 2013, 3, 183–216],
from which our construction evolves.
We thus provide a rigorous treatment of the security of our generic design; more precisely, we sharply bound the extraction failure of our protocol according to this security model.
Next we instantiate our formal construction with codes built from tensor-products as well as with Reed–Muller codes and lifted codes,
yielding
{\mathsf{PoR}}
s with moderate communication complexity and (server) storage overhead, in addition to the aforementioned features.
A coding theory foundation for the analysis of general unconditionally secure proof-of-retrievability schemes for cloud storage
