scholarly journals Public Proof of Retrievability Scheme against Active Attack in Cloud Storage

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhong Zhang ◽  
Wenjing Tang
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Active Attack ◽  
Proof Of Retrievability

scholarly journals Survey on Data Integrity, Recovery, and Proof of Retrievability Techniques in Cloud Storage

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.6) ◽  
pp. 55
Author(s):  
Neha Narayan Kulkarni ◽  
Shital Kumar A. Jain ◽  
. .
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Data Security ◽  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Data Integrity ◽  
Data Recovery ◽  
Unstructured Data ◽  
Large Memory ◽  
Local Storage ◽  
Proof Of Retrievability

Recently the technologies are growing fast, so they have become the point of source and also the sink for data. Data is generated in large volume introducing the concept of structured and unstructured data evolving "Big Data" which needs large memory for storage. There are two possible solutions either increase the local storage or use the Cloud Storage. Cloud makes data available to the user anytime, anywhere, anything. Cloud allows the user to store their data virtually without investing much. However, this data is on cloud raising a concern of data security and recovery. This attack is made by the untrusted or unauthorized user remotely. The attacker may modify, delete or replace the data. Therefore, different models are proposed for a data integrity check and proof of retrievability. This paper includes the literature review related to various techniques for data integrity, data recovery and proof of retrievability.  

Security Analysis on a Public POR Scheme in Cloud Storage

2014 ◽  
Vol 556-562 ◽  
pp. 5395-5399
Author(s):  
Jian Hong Zhang ◽  
Wen Jing Tang
Keyword(s):  
Data Storage ◽  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Security Analysis ◽  
Data Integrity ◽  
Data File ◽  
Cloud Data ◽  
Security Proof ◽  
Cloud Server ◽  
Cloud Data Storage ◽  
Active Attack

Data integrity is one of the biggest concerns with cloud data storage for cloud user. Besides, the cloud user’s constrained computing capabilities make the task of data integrity auditing expensive and even formidable. Recently, a proof-of-retrievability scheme proposed by Yuan et al. has addressed the issue, and security proof of the scheme was provided. Unfortunately, in this work we show that the scheme is insecure. Namely, the cloud server who maliciously modifies the data file can pass the verification, and the client who executes the cloud storage auditing can recover the whole data file through the interactive process. Furthermore, we also show that the protocol is vulnerable to an efficient active attack, which means that the active attacker is able to arbitrarily modify the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the auditing process. After giving the corresponding attacks to Yuan et al.’s scheme, we suggest a solution to fix the problems.

DIPOR: An IDA-based dynamic proof of retrievability scheme for cloud storage systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 104 ◽  
pp. 97-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anmin Fu ◽  
Yuhan Li ◽  
Shui Yu ◽  
Yan Yu ◽  
Gongxuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Storage Systems ◽  
Proof Of Retrievability

An Optimization Approach Towards a Proof of Retrievability Scheme for Cloud Storage

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 1812-1816
Author(s):  
Tan Choon Beng ◽  
Mohd Hanafi Ahmad Hijazi ◽  
Yuto Lim
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Optimization Approach ◽  
Proof Of Retrievability

scholarly journals Multi-prover proof of retrievability

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maura B. Paterson ◽  
Douglas R. Stinson ◽  
Jalaj Upadhyay
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Storage ◽  
Success Probability ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Computational Power ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Average Case ◽  
Recent Interest ◽  
High Success Probability ◽  
Multi Server ◽  
Proof Of Retrievability

Abstract There has been considerable recent interest in “cloud storage” wherein a user asks a server to store a large file. One issue is whether the user can verify that the server is actually storing the file, and typically a challenge-response protocol is employed to convince the user that the file is indeed being stored correctly. The security of these schemes is phrased in terms of an extractor which will recover the file given any “proving algorithm” that has a sufficiently high success probability. This forms the basis of proof-of-retrievability (PoR) systems. In this paper, we study multiple server PoR systems. We formalize security definitions for two possible scenarios: (i) A threshold of servers succeeds with high enough probability (worst case), and (ii) the average of the success probability of all the servers is above a threshold (average case). We also motivate the study of confidentiality of the outsourced message. We give MPoR schemes which are secure under both these security definitions and provide reasonable confidentiality guarantees even when there is no restriction on the computational power of the servers. We also show how classical statistical techniques previously used by us can be extended to evaluate whether the responses of the provers are accurate enough to permit successful extraction. We also look at one specific instantiation of our construction when instantiated with the unconditionally secure version of the Shacham–Waters scheme. This scheme gives reasonable security and privacy guarantee. We show that, in the multi-server setting with computationally unbounded provers, one can overcome the limitation that the verifier needs to store as much secret information as the provers.

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