scholarly journals Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity. A comment on Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Petersson
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractMichael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within that type of framework. If not, Searle’s type of theory need not be less qualitatively parsimonious than Bratman’s. This hangs on how we understand the notions of modes and contents of intentional states, and the relations between modes, contents, and categorizations of such states. Secondly, by questioning whether Bratman’s theory steers clear of debunking or dismissing collectivity. Elsewhere I have claimed that the manoeuvres Bratman suggested to avoid circularity in his conceptual analysis (in 1992 and 1997) undermine the strength of his resulting notion of collective action. Bratman responds in detail to this objection in his new book and I return to the issue towards the end of the paper.

Redundant Group Agency

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 364-384
Author(s):  
Lars J. K. Moen
Keyword(s):  
False Beliefs ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Group Agent ◽  
Group Members

According to group-agent realism, treating groups as agents with their own intentional states, irreducible to those of the group members, helps us explain and predict the groups’ behavior. This paper challenges this view. When groups judge logically interconnected propositions, group members often have incentives to misrepresent their beliefs concerning propositions they care less about in order to increase the probability of their groups adopting their view of propositions they consider more important. Aggregating such untruthful judgments may lead to the group forming false beliefs. Treating groups as agents will then not help us explain or predict their behavior.

scholarly journals Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractThese are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).

A POSITIVIST ROUTE FOR EXPLAINING HOW FACTS MAKE LAW

Legal Theory ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Plunkett
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Legal Institution ◽  
Frank Jackson ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Rational Relation ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Two Stages

In “How Facts Make Law” and other recent work, Mark Greenberg argues that legal positivists cannot develop a viable constitutive account of law that meets what he calls the “the rational-relation requirement.” He argues that this gives us reason to reject positivism in favor of antipositivism. In this paper, I argue that Greenberg is wrong: positivists can in fact develop a viable constitutive account of law that meets the rational-relation requirement. I make this argument in two stages. First, I offer an account of the rational-relation requirement. Second, I put forward a viable positivist account of law that I argue meets this requirement. The account that I propose is a version of Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law. The version of Shapiro's account that I propose combines (1) the account of concepts and conceptual analysis put forward by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson with (2) the account of the conceptlegal institution(and its conceptual connections to the conceptlegal norm) that we get from a certain reading of Shapiro's Planning Theory. In addition to providing a compelling response to Greenberg's argument in “How Facts Make Law,” I argue that the explanation for why my response to Greenberg works underscores one of the central problems facing legal antipositivism: namely, its lack of a convincing account of the nature of legal institutions.

scholarly journals Shared Agency in Modest Sociality

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Shared Agency

AbstractA contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.

scholarly journals Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Christopher Woodard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Relevant Group ◽  
Relevant Pattern ◽  
What Matters

AbstractGroup-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers.

Bratman on shared intention

SATS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181
Author(s):  
Christian Kietzmann
Keyword(s):  
Human Agency ◽  
Shared Intention ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
Michael Bratman ◽  
Single Person ◽  
Analytic Strategy ◽  
Individual Planning ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Central Claim

AbstractIn work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.

scholarly journals Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman
Keyword(s):  
Planning Theory ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Shared Agency ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractA précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).

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