The distinct existences argument revisited

The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than 50 years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity.

A Interpretação Epistêmica da Semântica Bidimensional

O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional. AbstractThis paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario.

¿Es el argumento del conocimiento de Jackson un knock‐out al fisicalismo reductivo?

El presente artículo busca responder la pregunta sobre si el argumento del conocimiento planteado por Frank Jackson, en los casos de Mary y Fred, logra ser una crítica demoledora en contra del fisicalismo reductivista. El argumento del conocimiento de Jackson tuvo como objetivo probar la insuficiencia del fisicalismo reductivista para explicar la realidad, como también demostrar la existencia de qualia epifenoménicos (elementos no físicos e impotentes causalmente). Mi respuesta a la pregunta planteada es negativa, puesto que considero que el fisicalismo reductivista sí logra superar el problema planteado por Jackson valiéndose de sus propias premisas y que, por otra parte, los qualia epifenoménicos sí poseen un cierto rol causal.

Knowledge argument

The knowledge argument is an argument against physicalism, the view that the world is wholly physical. It was developed by Frank Jackson (1943–) and is based on the following thought experiment. Everything that can be known through the physical, chemical, and biological sciences – the complete physical truth – has been discovered. Mary is a brilliant scientist who is raised in a black-and-white room. She has never had colour experiences. But she learns the complete physical truth, which includes the completed science of colour vision, by reading books and watching lectures on a black-and-white television monitor. Then she leaves the room and sees colours. Jackson’s argument runs roughly as follows. When Mary leaves the room, she learns something new. She learns what it is like to see in colour. Evidently, the complete physical truth is not the complete truth about the world. Ergo, physicalism is false. Some react by denying that Mary learns anything when she leaves the room. Others react by accepting that she learns something but denying that this refutes physicalism. Still others accept the argument as sound. The ensuing discussion has led to a variety of insights about consciousness and its place in the natural world.

ARE MORAL FUNCTIONALISM’S MORAL A PRIORI COMMITMENTS REALLY A PRIORI?

Moral functionalism, a metaethical theory developed by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, claims that we can attain moral knowledge by ascertaining the commonplaces about morality that are typically accepted by actual agents. It has important a priori commitments; whilst we may discover a posteriori that a particular descriptive property is identical to a particular moral property, it is a priori that the thing that is identical to the moral property, whatever that thing actually is, plays a particular role. Jackson holds a particular metaphysical position, and moral functionalism is a development of that position as it applies to ethics. In this paper I adapt an objection made by D.H. Mellor against Jackson’s metaphysics to show that moral functionalism’s a priori commitments are actually a posteriori. We can only discover if moral functionalism’s purportedly a priori claims are true through a posteriori investigation.

New thoughts about old facts

In a famous paper by Prior, ontological, epistemic, and semantic considerations are entangled in a way that creates the illusion of an ontological argument about the nature of time. This chapter defends the thesis that Prior’s argument is best interpreted as a “knowledge argument,” similar to that raised by Frank Jackson against physicalism. At a linguistic level, the authors argue that an utterance like “Thank goodness that is over [now]” expresses the same proposition as “Thank goodness the date of the conclusion of the root canal is Friday, June 15, 1954,” when uttered on the same date. At the epistemic level, it is argued that the two are associated with different motivating thoughts. At the ontological level, the authors reject the assumption that the proposition related to the utterance “Thank goodness that is over [now]” and its associated thought require the existence of A-properties.