A Ontologia Social Analítica: Por uma Interlocução com a Teoria Sociológica

RESUMO O propósito deste artigo é aproximar as discussões da filosofia social analítica do movimento de virada ontológica que ocorre hoje nas Ciências Sociais. Com esse fim, apresentam-se alguns dos autores mais representativos da ontologia social analítica sobre o tema da intencionalidade coletiva. Demonstra-se que, de forma similar ao que acontece na teoria sociológica, seus principais representantes divergem sobre a relação de prioridade entre o nível micro ou macro da realidade social, defendendo posições identificadas com o holismo (John Searle e Margaret Gilbert), o coletivismo moderado (Raimo Tuomela) ou o individualismo relacional (Michael Bratman). Defende-se que a similaridade dessa problemática com as discussões sociológicas, sobre a relação micro/macro, representa uma importante plataforma de interlocução entre estas tradições disciplinares.

Future-Directed Intentions and the Theory of Instrumental Rationality

This chapter considers a major alternative to the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR): the view, pioneered by Michael Bratman, that future-directed intentions (FDIs) have a fundamental role to play in our understanding of the rationality of extended agency. FDIs come in many flavours; they can be specific intentions, plans, policies, or projects. I argue in this chapter that ETR naturally classifies some of these “flavours” as instances of extended actions, and therefore they are structurally identical and subject to the exact same basic instrumental requirements as other instances of extended actions. Once we see this point, it turns out that purported norms and principles governing FDIs are either superfluous or invalid.

A hard choice for Tomasello

Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.

Bratman on shared intention

In work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s analysis of shared intention, which for him is not asui generisphenomenon, but can be understood in terms of his concept of individual agency, as the main components of his account of shared intention are already available in his account of the intentions of a single person.In this paper, I want to critically examine Bratman’s approach to shared intention. I will proceed as follows: In Section 1, I will describe the analytic strategy that guides Bratman’s analysis. Section 2 will introduce his central claim that the fulfilment of a list of conditions suffices for a shared intention to be present. In Sections 3 to 5, I will discuss and criticise some of these conditions. In Section 6, I will draw some positive conclusions from my critical arguments.

Shared Agency in Modest Sociality

A contribution to a symposium on Michael Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.

Practical Intersubjectivity and Normative Guidance: Bratman on Shared Agency

In an important new book on shared agency, Michael Bratman develops an account of the normative demand for the coordination of intentions amongst participants in shared agency. Bratman seeks to understand this form of normative guidance in terms of that associated with individual planning intentions. I give reasons to resist his form of reductionism. In addition, I note how Bratman’s discussion raises the interesting issue of the function or purpose of shared intention and of shared agency more generally. According to Bratman, the function of shared intention is to promote interpersonal coordination of intention and action. I suggest that power sharing amongst participants must also be included as a function of shared intention.