Juvenile aftercare decision-making systems that classify parolees according to perceived risk and needs are designed to render uniform the treatment of these individuals by juvenile parole officials. This article analyzes a system implemented by Arizona to determine if the intensity of supervision received by parolees differs as a function of classification score. Supervision of a random sample of 280 parolees was tracked for 90 days. The analysis indicates that intensity of supervision does not differ based on the classification score, suggesting that the instrument does not control the decision making of the street-level bureaucrats, the parole officers.
AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.
AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.
AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.
