United States Supreme Court Rules on Expert Testimony

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-96
Author(s):  
A. H. Feller

To the ever-increasing confusion of doctrine which makes up the law of sovereign immunity, the courts of the United States have added procedural complications which, though not as weighty, are nevertheless as puzzling as any of the substantive rules. Of recent years the United States Supreme Court and the lower Federal courts have often had occasion to consider the method whereby the question of immunity was raised. The result has been the evolution of a set of rules so vaguely defined in the decisions as to offer little guidance to the bench and bar, and withal of interest to the scholar who finds that these rules exist in no other judicial system.


1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Hodder-Williams

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.


1995 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven D. Penrod ◽  
Solomon M. Fulero ◽  
Brian L. Cutler

This paper examines the legal and scientific aspects of expert psychological testimony in the United States and discusses the possible implications for such testimony of a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court. We consider expert testimony on eyewitness identification issues as an illustration of the reaction of the courts to, particularly, novel scientific evidence offered in adversarial settings. First, an historical perspective on the use of expert testimony is traced with particular attention to the criteria that state and federal courts have used in determining whether to admit expert testimony. We then examine the new Supreme Court decision and discuss its implications for the use of expert eyewitness testimony. We conclude by illustrating how eyewitness research and research on jury decisionmaking is likely to assume new importance in light of new expert evidence criteria.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-347
Author(s):  
Vanja-Ivan Savić

Exactly 80 years has passed since the completion of the United States Supreme Court building. This comment is not another paper about the importance or historical influence of the greatest of all American institutions, nor about dramatic cases which shaped America, nor about justices and their approaches, nor about characters or world views. It is about architecture and the messages which are sent from the facade of this strong institution to which legal scholars and practitioners from around the world look.


1998 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 399
Author(s):  
Karen Belt

This article examines the approach of the High Court to the admissibility of novel scientific expert evidence in R v Calder (Unreported, 12 April 1995, High Court, Christchurch Registry, T 154/94). In Calder, Tipping J establishes a "gatekeeping" role for judges which requires them to test novel scientific evidence for relevance and reliability. The article compares that approach with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 469. The implications of such a test are considered.  Although the Court of Appeal has not considered the issues raised in Calder, the article concludes that the approach is the most suitable one for New Zealand.  


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document