scholarly journals A Filosofia da Ciência de Bas van Fraassen e o Seu Voluntarismo Epistêmico, de Kathleen Okruhlik

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-416
Author(s):  
Alessio Gava
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen

Resumo: A visão antirrealista acerca da ciência de Bas van Fraassen desempenhou um papel determinante no desenvolvimento da filosofia da ciência recente. Particularmente, seu empirismo construtivo tem sido amplamente discutido e criticado, nas revistas especializadas, e constitui um tópico comumente abordado nos programas das disciplinas de filosofia da ciência. Outros aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen são menos conhecidos. Entre eles, sua abordagem empirista às leis científicas, sua reavaliação, relativamente recente, do que significa ser um empirista e seu estruturalismo empirista. O presente estudo visa a oferecer uma panorâmica desses diferentes aspectos do empirismo de van Fraassen e mostrar como estão relacionados entre si. Detém-se, ainda, sobre a natureza do voluntarismo epistêmico de van Fraassen e seu nexo com a filosofia da ciência empirista desse autor.

The Empirical Stance ? Bas van Fraassen

2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-177
Author(s):  
John Ross Churchill
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Empirical Stance

scholarly journals Datos, fenómenos y representación: sobre el estructuralismo empirista de van Fraassen

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (157) ◽  
pp. 137-149
Author(s):  
José Luis Rolleri
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen

<p>En este escrito se analizan ciertos conceptos del estructuralismo empirista de Bas van Fraassen, en particular, el de representación, para intentar una crítica a su posición con respecto al vínculo entre los modelos de las teorías y, en última instancia, el mundo físico por medio de los modelos de datos, a los cuales van Fraassen les adjudica el papel de representantes de los fenómenos. Al final se delinea, a muy grandes rasgos, una alternativa conceptualista.</p>

scholarly journals Realism, empiricism and causal inquiry in International Relations: What is at stake?

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Constructive Empiricism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Everyday World

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.

4. Realism and anti‐realism

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen ◽  
Aim Of Science ◽  
The World ◽  
True Description ◽  
Underdetermination Argument

‘Realism and anti-realism’ is concerned with the debate between scientific realism and its converse, anti-realism or instrumentalism. Realists hold that the aim of science is to provide a true description of the world. Anti-realists hold that it is to provide a true description of the ‘observable’ part of the world. The ‘no miracles’ argument, one of the strongest arguments for scientific realism, is shown to be a plausibility argument — an inference to the best explanation. Central to the debate between realism and anti-realism is the observable/unobservable distinction and the views of realist Grover Maxwell and anti-realist Bas van Fraassen are described. The underdetermination argument is also explained.

The Reformed Stance

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gijsbert van den Brink ◽  
Johan Smits
Keyword(s):  
Reformed Theology ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen

This article attempts to answer the question what makes a particular theology “Reformed”. First of all, three fairly common ways to answer this question are criticized as being reductionist. Over against such attempts, the authors emphasize the plurality of Reformed theology. Next, however, drawing on a concept introduced by philosopher of science Bas van Fraassen, they argue that Reformed theology can still be described as a distinct phenomenon when it is approached as a stance, i.e. as a particular outlook characterized by specific commitments and concerns, rather than as a unique set of propositional beliefs. Finally, it is argued that many of the concerns and commitments that are typical of Reformed theology can be loosely derived from the traditional Reformed adage ecclesia reformata quia semper reformanda secundum verbum Dei.

scholarly journals A não-ciência de humanóides e golfinhos: Van Fraassen e o conceito de comunidade epistêmica

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-300
Author(s):  
Alessio Gava
Keyword(s):  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Bas Van Fraassen

A noção de comunidade epistêmica é essencial para a caracterização da observabilidade, conceito-chave para o empirismo construtivo de Bas van Fraassen. Segundo o filósofo holandês, com efeito, observável seria uma abreviação de observável-para-nós. Neste trabalho será mostrado que a suposta rigididade do autor de A Imagem Científica, o qual parece não estar disposto a admitir mudanças na composição da comunidade epistêmica (constituída, segundo ele, pela raça humana), é na verdade uma assunção de modéstia e de bom senso; trata-se do reconhecimento de que o empreendimento científico nada mais é do que uma atividade humana, entre muitas outras.

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