Deconstructing the Phantom: Duhem and the Scientific Realism Debate

For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism.

What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects

Philosophers sometimes give arguments that presuppose the following principle: two theories can fail to be empirically equivalent on the sole basis that they present different “thick” metaphysical pictures of the world. Recently, a version of this principle has been invoked to respond to the argument that composite objects are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This response claims that our empirical evidence distinguishes between ordinary and composite-free theories, and it empirically favors the ordinary ones (Hofweber 2016, 2018). In this paper, I ask whether this response to the dispensability argument is tenable. I claim that it is not. This is because it presupposes an indefensible thesis about when two empirical consequences are distinct or the same. My argument provides some insight into what our empirical consequences are, and I conclude that empirical evidence is radically metaphysically neutral. This gives us some insight into the significant content of our scientific theories—the content that a scientific realist is committed to—and I show how this insight relates to questions about theoretical equivalence more broadly.

Combining Realist approaches and Normalization Process Theory to understand implementation: a systematic review

Background Realist approaches and Normalization Process Theory (NPT) have both gained significant traction in implementation research over the past 10 years. The aim of this study was therefore to explore how the approaches are combined to understand problems of implementation, to determine the degree of complementarity of the two approaches and to provide practical approaches for using them together. Methods Systematic review of research studies combining Realist and NPT approaches. Realist methodology is concerned with understanding and explaining causation, that is, how and why policies, programmes and interventions achieve their effects. NPT is a theory of implementation that explains how practices become normalised. Databases searched (January 2020) were ASSIA, CINAHL, Health Research Premium Collection via Proquest (Family Health Database, Health & Medical Collection, Health Management Database, MEDLINE, Nursing & Allied Health Database, Psychology Database, Public Health Database) and PsycARTICLES. Studies were included if the author(s) stated they used both approaches: a scientific Realist perspective applying the principles of Pawson and Tilley’s Realist Evaluation or Pawson’s Realist Synthesis and Normalization Process Theory either solely or in addition to other theories. Two authors screened records; discrepancies were reviewed by a third screener. Data was extracted by three members of the team and a narrative synthesis was undertaken. Results Of 245 total records identified, 223 unique records were screened and 39 full-text papers were reviewed, identifying twelve papers for inclusion in the review. These papers represented eight different studies. Extent and methods of integration of the approaches varied. In most studies (6/8), Realist approaches were the main driver. NPT was mostly used to enhance the explanatory power of Realist analyses, informing development of elements of Contexts, Mechanisms and Outcomes (a common heuristic in realist work). Authors’ reflections on the integration of NPT and Realist approaches were limited. Conclusions Using Realist and NPT approaches in combination can add explanatory power for understanding the implementation of interventions and programmes. Attention to detailed reporting on methods and analytical process when combining approaches, and appraisal of theoretical and practical utility is advised for advancing knowledge of applying these approaches in research. Systematic review registration Not registered.

Selective Scientific Realism and Truth-Transfer in Theories of Molecular Structure

This chapter examines theoretical advances in understanding molecular structures at the turn of the 20th century which resulted from the Blomstrand-Jørgensen/Werner debate about the structure of cobalt complexes. Both models made predictions testable through precipitation experiments, which eventually led to Werner’s model replacing the Blomstrand-Jørgensen model of cobalt complexes. We argue that this example of theory change fits within a selective scientific realist framework: namely, the factors which gave rise to the predictive success of the failed model survived in the theory that replaced it. We further argue that the lessons from this historical case can illuminate how two contemporary objections to realism—P. Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and Timothy D. Lyons’ pessimistic modus tollens argument—fall short as arguments against realism.

Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?

Hans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach’s view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.

Systemic Materialist Realist Ontology, Epistemology, Semantics, Axiology and Ethics: Why Pearl’s counterfactuals and Pawson’s methods are insufficient for causation in Social Epidemiology and Public Health

We evaluate counterfactual empiricism, the dominant philosophy of science in contemporary epidemiology and public health from a scientific realist perspective. Building on our earlier work, we critique the dominant counterfactual/potential outcomes epistemology in epidemiology and public health, based on its neglect of ontology and exclusion of causal mechanisms which are confused with statistical inference methods (e.g., mediation). We argue that a realist systemic materialist ontology of levels , scientific realist epistemology, and realist semantics, axiology and ethics could constitute a best philosophical system for the disciplines of social epidemiology and public health, and their social inequalities in health subdivisions

Scientific Realism Without Reality? What Happens When Metaphysics is Left Out

Scientific realism is usually presented as if metaphysical realism (i.e. the thesis that there is a structured mind-independent external world) were one of its essential parts. This paper aims to examine how weak the metaphysical commitments endorsed by scientific realists could be. I will argue that scientific realism could be stated without accepting any form of metaphysical realism. Such a conclusion does not go as far as to try to combine scientific realism with metaphysical antirealism. Instead, it amounts to the combination of the former with a weaker view, called quietism, which is agnostic on the existence of mind-independent structures. In Sect. 2, I will argue that the minimal claim that brings together every scientific realist view is devoid of any metaphysical commitment. In Sect. 3, I will define metaphysical realism and antirealism. Such work will be instrumental in providing a more precise statement of quietism. Finally (Sect. 4), I will argue that assuming quietism, it is still possible to make sense of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists.

Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties

Traditionally, many arguments for realism about properties (universals or tropes) rely on a priori claims. The author argues that if we make use of an abductive principle that is commonly employed by scientific realists, a new argument for property realism can be formulated which is based firmly in scientific practice. The abductive principle says that we should believe in the existence of certain theoretical entities if they figure in the best explanation for what scientists observe. The scientific argument for property realism then says (roughly) that the best explanation for various behavioural patterns that physical scientists observe is that microscopic entities (such as electrons) instantiate stable, causally efficacious properties. After presenting the argument, the author defends it against possible objections. More generally, the article provides a case study for how science and metaphysics can work together to generate ontological claims.