scholarly journals Lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic: sustainability is an indispensable condition of Global Health Security

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deisy de Freitas Lima Ventura ◽  
Gabriela Marques di Giulio ◽  
Danielle Hanna Rached

Abstract Among the possible developments of the Covid-19 pandemic at the international and national levels is the advancement of the Global Health Security (GHS) agenda. On the one hand, GHS might be able to give priority to health problems on the political agenda-setting, on the other, however, it might open up space for public security actors in decision-making processes to the detriment of the power of health authorities. This article critically analyzes the concept and the progress of the GHS agenda seeking to demonstrate that there can be no security in matters of public health when sustainability in its multiple dimensions is not taken into account. At the end, sustainability has a twofold responsibility: to maintain the consistency and permanence of emergency response actions, especially with investments in public health systems, with universal access, and to minimize the structural causes of pandemics linked to the environment.

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 412-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsion Berhane Ghedamu ◽  
Benjamin Mason Meier

Immunization plays a crucial role in global health security, preventing public health emergencies of international concern and protecting individuals from infectious disease outbreaks, yet these critical public health benefits are dependent on immunization law. Where public health law has become central to preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease, public health law reform is seen as necessary to implement the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). This article examines national immunization laws as a basis to implement the GHSA and promote the public's health, analyzing the scope and content of these laws to prevent infectious disease across Sub-Saharan Africa. Undertaking policy surveillance of national immunization laws in 20 Sub-Saharan African countries, this study: (1) developed a legal framework to map the legal attributes relevant to immunization; (2) created an assessment tool to determine the presence of these attributes under national immunization law; and (3) applied this assessment tool to code national legal landscapes. An analysis of these coded laws highlights legal attributes that govern vaccine requirements, supply chains, vaccine administration standards, and medicines quality and manufacturer liability. Based upon this international policy surveillance, it will be crucial to undertake legal epidemiology research across countries, examining the influence of immunization law on vaccination rates and disease outbreaks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Dagmar Rychnovská

The discourse on the infodemic constructs the combination of the pandemic and disinformation as a new source of insecurity on a global scale. How can we make sense – analytically and politically– of this newly politicized nexus of public health, information management, and global security? This article proposes approaching the phenomenon of the infodemic as an intersecting securitization of information disorder and health governance. Specifically, it argues that there are two distinct frames of security mobilized in the context of infodemic governance: information as a disease and information as a weapon. Drawing on literatures on global health and the emerging research on disinformation, the paper situates the two framings of the infodemic in broader discourses on the medicalization of security, and securitization of information disorder, respectively. The article critically reflects on each framing and offers some preliminary thoughts on how to approach the entanglements of health, security, and information disorder in contemporary global politics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Mason Meier ◽  
Kara Tureski ◽  
Emily Bockh ◽  
Derek Carr ◽  
Ana Ayala ◽  
...  

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 568-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick M. Burkle

AbstractIf the Ebola tragedy of West Africa has taught us anything, it should be that the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) Treaty, which gave unprecedented authority to the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide global public health security during public health emergencies of international concern, has fallen severely short of its original goal. After encouraging successes with the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic, the intent of the legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats has shamefully lapsed. Despite the granting of 2-year extensions in 2012 to countries to meet core surveillance and response requirements, less than 20% of countries have complied. Today it is not realistic to expect that these gaps will be solved or narrowed in the foreseeable future by the IHR or the WHO alone under current provisions. The unfortunate failures that culminated in an inadequate response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa are multifactorial, including funding, staffing, and poor leadership decisions, but all are reversible. A rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas has been crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the G20 as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the IHR Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of ongoing failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction worldwide. Practitioners and health decision-makers worldwide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:568–580)


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (S1) ◽  
pp. 103-106
Author(s):  
Brent Davidson ◽  
Susan Sherman ◽  
Leila Barraza ◽  
Maria Julia Marinissen

In an increasingly interconnected global community, severe disasters or disease outbreaks in one country or region may rapidly impact global health security. As seen during the responses to the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, and the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa, local response capacities can be rapidly overwhelmed and international assistance may be necessary to support the affected region to respond and recover and to protect other countries from the spread of disease. For example, President Obama stated on September 16, 2014, that “if the [Ebola] outbreak is not stopped now, we could be looking at hundreds of thousands of people infected, with profound political and economic and security implications for all of us…. [T]his…is not just a threat to regional security — it’s a potential threat to global security if these countries break down…. And that’s why…I directed my team to make this a national security priority.”


Author(s):  
Michele Best ◽  
Jean Sakande

The role of national health laboratories in support of public health response has expanded beyond laboratory testing to include a number of other core functions such as emergency response, training and outreach, communications, laboratory-based surveillance and data management. These functions can only be accomplished by an efficient and resilient national laboratory network that includes public health, reference, clinical and other laboratories. It is a primary responsibility of the national health laboratory in the Ministry of Health to develop and maintain the national laboratory network in the country. In this article, we present practical recommendations based on 17 years of network development experience for the development of effective national laboratory networks. These recommendations and examples of current laboratory networks, are provided to facilitate laboratory network development in other states. The development of resilient, integrated laboratory networks will enhance each state’s public health system and is critical to the development of a robust national laboratory response network to meet global health security threats.


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