scholarly journals Critical remarks on the International Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 3(g) of the “Definition of Aggression”(UNGA Resolution 3314/1974)

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taciano Scheidt Zimmermann

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent the Article 3(g) of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3314/1974 XXIX) can be interpreted using the case-law of the International Court of Justice. Three judgments delivered by the Court are analyzed: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). Special attention is given to the connection between international norms on the use of force and the law of international responsibility, as well as to the meaning and status attributed by the Court to the expressions “sending” and “substantial involvement,” both present in Article 3(g).

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 352-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Crook

During 2002, countries from all regions, especially Africa, resorted to the International Court of Justice; only one of the Court's 2002 judgments involved an OECD countiy. The Court's work during the year also shows the continued importance of boundary issues for states and for the Court.The Court again completed a substantial program of work, resolving three cases with final judgments. In February, it triggered substantial controversy by finding that a Belgian court's warrant for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) violated international law. In October, it resolved a complex of boundary disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, although by year-end Nigeria had not yet implemented the Court's key requirement—withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula. In December, comparing sparse effectivités, it concluded that Malaysia, and not Indonesia, had sovereignty over two small disputed islands.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-649 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Mathias

In 2005, the International Court of Justice issued three judgments.l In February, the Court upheld an objection to its jurisdiction in Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany). In July, a chamber of the Court issued its judgment on the merits in Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger). In December, the full Court issued its judgment on the merits in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda).


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean D' Aspremont

Any observer of the practice of the International Court of Justice (hereafter the ICJ or the Court) may have noticed the growing tendency of the United Nations judicial body to formulate recommendations to the parties that have appeared before it. Indeed, the Court is more and more inclined to recommend that the parties allay their dispute and alleviate all ensuing human sufferings. This leaning is particularly observable when the Court simultaneously dismisses a request for the indication of provisional measures. For instance, in the recent order rendered by the Court in the case concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), the Court made the following declaration:


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 782-787
Author(s):  
Malcom D Evans ◽  
Chester Brown

Since 1998, a war has ravaged one of Africa's largest countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’). Africa's ‘Great War’ is said to have involved nine national armies and an unknown number of militia groups, and has reportedly claimed more lives than any other in the last four years. Estimates of the death toll range from 3 to 3.5 million. On 28 May 2002, the DRC instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (‘the Court’) against Rwanda alleging ‘massive, serious and flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’, and requested certain provisional measures.2 On 10 July 2002, the Court rejected the DRC’s request for provisional measures, as it considered that it did not have prima facie jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.3 However, the Court also rejected Rwanda's request that the case be removed from the list, as the Court considered that its lack of jurisdiction was not ‘manifest’.4 This note reviews the history of the conflict and the litigation, before considering the DRC's request for provisional measures and the grounds of jurisdiction upon which it sought to rely. The Order is then analysed, and this note concludes that the Court was right to reject the DRC's request, but it should have gone further and removed the case from the list.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
James Thuo Gathii

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). At <http://www.icj-cij.org>.International Court of Justice, December 19, 2005.In its December 19, 2005, judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo v. Uganda (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Uganda to have engaged in grave violations of the prohibition on the use of force and of its international humanitarian and human rights obligations during its occupation of Congelese territory. The Court also found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations for its treatment of Ugandan diplomats and also for the destruction of their diplomatic premises and the associated archives and records.The train of events leading to this case originated in May 1997 with President Laurent-Desire Kabila's deposition of Zairean dictator Mobutu-Ssese Seko. Having come to power with Ugandan and Rwandese military assistance, Kabila was unsuccessful in his effort to remove Ugandan and Rwandese troops from the DRC (paras. 48–50). The DRC alleged that in August 1998, Ugandan armed forces invaded (para. 29) and then captured and occupied Congolese towns and territory in defiance of Kabila's decision that Ugandan and Rwandese forces should leave the DRC (para. 29–31). Further, the DRC contended that Uganda recruited, funded, trained, equipped, and supplied armed Congolese groups opposed to the Kabila government (para. 32).


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 775-781
Author(s):  
Malcom D Evans ◽  
Chanaka Wickremasinghe

On declining to make an order for provisional measures in the case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, the International Court of Justice nevertheless indicated that it was desirable that the Court should deal with the issues raised by the case ‘as soon as possible’, and that it was appropriate therefore to seek to determine the application ‘with all expedition’.1 In the event, questions of admissibility and the merits were taken together and the Parties agreed to file a single set of written pleadings each, enabling the Court to hold oral hearings in October 2001 and to render a final judgment on 14 February 20022 (ie, only about 16 months after the original application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)). Despite the speed with which the Court dealt with the case, its judgment has come in for considerable comment and criticism from a number of quarters3 as much for what is not said, as for what is in fact contained in the rather spare terms of the judgment. It will be suggested here that the ratio decidendi of the case is in fact rather confined, and that caution should be adopted in seeking to draw wider implications from what was said or left unsaid.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D. Evans ◽  
Dino Kritsiotis

It might be thought an unusual or peculiar feature of international relations that, on occasion, States engaged in an armed conflict decide to appeal to international law and institutions for the provision of immediate judicial remedies.2 Yet, within the short space of 14 months, the International Court of Justice has twice found itself on the receiving end of such requests: in the first of these cases, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) filed an application on 29 April 1999 against 10 Member States of NATO for using armed force against the FRY in March 1999. At the same time, the FRY made a request for provisional measures, in which it asked the Court to indicate that the States involved “cease immediately [their] acts of use of force” and “refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against the FRY.3 In June 1999 the Court dismissed this request.4


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