scholarly journals Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice

AI Magazine ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Chevaleyre ◽  
Ulle Endriss ◽  
Jérôme Lang ◽  
Nicolas Maudet
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Compact Representation ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Computational Point ◽  
Multiagent Resource Allocation ◽  
Preference Handling

In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.

scholarly journals Combining Social Choice Theory and Argumentation: Enabling Collective Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-173
Author(s):  
Jordi Ganzer-Ripoll ◽  
Natalia Criado ◽  
Maite Lopez-Sanchez ◽  
Simon Parsons ◽  
Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making

scholarly journals Mehanizmi odlucivanja i strateske manipulacije

2004 ◽  
Vol 44 (161) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Dragan Azdejkovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Design Approach ◽  
Collective Decision Making

The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of collective decision making. In this paper, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach.

scholarly journals Borda Count in Collective Decision Making: A Summary of Recent Results

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 9830-9836
Author(s):  
Jörg Rothe
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Borda Count ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Ordinal Preferences

Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summarize recent advances related to Borda in computational social choice and, more generally, in collective decision making. We first present a variety of well known attacks modeling strategic behavior in voting—including manipulation, control, and bribery—and discuss how resistant Borda is to them in terms of computational complexity. We then describe how Borda can be used to maximize social welfare when indivisible goods are to be allocated to agents with ordinal preferences. Finally, we illustrate the use of Borda in forming coalitions of players in a certain type of hedonic game. All these approaches are central to applications in artificial intelligence.

Reconsidering the Role of Political Argument in Democratic Politics

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Analytical Argument

This chapter examines three ways that political argument can affect democratic decision making and, thus, significantly mitigate the force of the social choice challenge. By engaging in political argument, relevant agents can settle the dimensions that, in any instance, structure their disagreements. This causal effect not only dampens the prospects that collective decision making will generate cyclical outcomes, it thereby reduces the opportunities for strategic manipulation that such instability presents. Once the analytical argument has established the possibility that voting, augmented by argument, could produce normatively legitimate decisions, the chapter considers two ways in which democratic argument can enhance the quality of such decisions: diversity and reflexivity.

scholarly journals A MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE AND AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Perote-Peña ◽  
Ashley Piggins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Aggregation Rule ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Forum

Abstract:We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. Individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is ‘truth-revealing’. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of both the original profile of judgements and the size of the electorate.

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