scholarly journals A MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE AND AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Perote-Peña ◽  
Ashley Piggins
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Aggregation Rule ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Forum

Abstract:We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. Individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is ‘truth-revealing’. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of both the original profile of judgements and the size of the electorate.

scholarly journals Mehanizmi odlucivanja i strateske manipulacije

2004 ◽  
Vol 44 (161) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Dragan Azdejkovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Design Approach ◽  
Collective Decision Making

The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of collective decision making. In this paper, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach.

Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules

2019 ◽  
pp. 126-144
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Paroush
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Aggregation Rule ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Relevant Variables ◽  
Aggregation Of Information ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

A group of individuals faces the choice of an alternative out of a set of alternatives. Each member of the group holds an opinion regarding the most suitable (best) alternative for which he or she votes. In this setting, the individual votes are based on their decisional competencies, which hinge on the information to which they are exposed and on their ability to make use of that information. The main question is how to translate the group members’ voting profile to a single collective choice. This chapter studies different aspects of this question in the context of binary voting where the group faces only two alternatives. The selection of an appropriate aggregation rule is a central issue in the fields of social choice, public choice, voting theory, and collective decision making. Since the votes are based on the individual competencies, the applied aggregation rule should take into account not only the voting profile but also the competency profile. In fact, it should also take into consideration any other relevant environmental information such as the asymmetry between the feasible alternatives, the dependence between individual votes, decision-making costs, and the available past record of the voters’ decisions. The chapter focuses on the clarification of the relationship between the performance of binary aggregation rules and the relevant variables and parameters. This has direct normative implications regarding the desirable mode of collective decision making and, in particular, regarding the desirable aggregation rule and the size and the composition of the decision-making body.

Reconsidering the Role of Political Argument in Democratic Politics

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Analytical Argument

This chapter examines three ways that political argument can affect democratic decision making and, thus, significantly mitigate the force of the social choice challenge. By engaging in political argument, relevant agents can settle the dimensions that, in any instance, structure their disagreements. This causal effect not only dampens the prospects that collective decision making will generate cyclical outcomes, it thereby reduces the opportunities for strategic manipulation that such instability presents. Once the analytical argument has established the possibility that voting, augmented by argument, could produce normatively legitimate decisions, the chapter considers two ways in which democratic argument can enhance the quality of such decisions: diversity and reflexivity.

scholarly journals Combining Social Choice Theory and Argumentation: Enabling Collective Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-173
Author(s):  
Jordi Ganzer-Ripoll ◽  
Natalia Criado ◽  
Maite Lopez-Sanchez ◽  
Simon Parsons ◽  
Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making

scholarly journals Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice

AI Magazine ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Chevaleyre ◽  
Ulle Endriss ◽  
Jérôme Lang ◽  
Nicolas Maudet
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Compact Representation ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Computational Social Choice ◽  
Computational Point ◽  
Multiagent Resource Allocation ◽  
Preference Handling

In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.

scholarly journals Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoi Terzopoulou ◽  
Ulle Endriss
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Natural Number ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Aggregation Rule ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Strategic Manipulation

AbstractWe analyse the incentives of individuals to misrepresent their truthful judgments when engaged in collective decision-making. Our focus is on scenarios in which individuals reason about the incentives of others before choosing which judgments to report themselves. To this end, we introduce a formal model of strategic behaviour in logic-based judgment aggregation that accounts for such higher-level reasoning as well as the fact that individuals may only have partial information about the truthful judgments and preferences of their peers. We find that every aggregation rule must belong to exactly one of three possible categories: it is either (i) immune to strategic manipulation for every level of reasoning, or (ii) manipulable for every level of reasoning, or (iii) immune to manipulation only for every kth level of reasoning, for some natural number k greater than 1.

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