Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the Separation of Powers in Federal Polity and “Wills of Nation”

The problem of this article is built around the tension between the concept of organ sovereignty and democracy theory. First of all, this vision of sovereignty fails to describe the diverse forms of popular participation in collective decision-making. It speaks very sparingly of the people as a political actor. Moreover, the concept of organ sovereignty does not provide the theoretical resources to describe the intermediary bodies in the space between the state and the individual. The tradition of liberal democracy emphasises the importance of such bodies for maintaining popular control over state. Also, the idea of organ sovereignty, by reducing all power to a single legislature, ignores the demand for self-government coming from communities located within the same state and yet united by a certain collective identity. Today, democracy theorists are turning to the concepts of federalism in order to overcome the above-mentioned limitations set by the concept of organ sovereignty. So far, however, the concepts of federalism have not been very convincing in describing the various forms of popular participation in collective decision-making. Above all, they have failed to consistently justify the existence of multiple decision-making centres within a single polity. The article argues that the model of the federal polity proposed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his later work “Considerations on the mode of government in Poland” explains how within one polity multiple centres of collective decision-making can coexist. The model also provides an understanding of how citizen participation in multiple decision-making centres can be organised.

14. The Committee of Permanent Representatives:

The Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) originated as a diplomatic forum to meet regularly and prepare meetings of the Council of Ministers. It quickly and quietly evolved into a locus of continuous negotiation and de facto decision-making, gaining a reputation as ‘the place to do the deal’. This reputation is based on insulation from domestic audiences and an unrivalled ability to make deals stick across a range of issue areas and policy subjects. Most importantly, Coreper spotlights the process of integrating interests in a collective decision-making system with its own organizational culture, norms, and style of discourse. In actual operation, the Committee has much to offer institutional theorizing, as multiple ‘logics’ of action are discernible and often complexly entwined.

Must the Apocalypse Disappoint? Philosophers in the Midst of Climate Change and Before

Is self-preservation the only question humanity faces when confronted with self-induced annihilation? Must humanity not also ask whether there are different ways of extinguishing itself? Whether an extinction that a few impose on the many should not be distinguished from an extinction that results from a collective decision? Is there a self-extinction of humanity that can testify to its unity and autonomy rather than to its dividedness?

Better baboon break-ups: collective decision theory of complex social network fissions

Many social groups are made up of complex social networks in which each individual associates with a distinct subset of its groupmates. If social groups become larger over time, competition often leads to a permanent group fission. During such fissions, complex social networks present a collective decision problem and a multidimensional optimization problem: it is advantageous for each individual to remain with their closest allies after a fission, but impossible for every individual to do so. Here, we develop computational algorithms designed to simulate group fissions in a network-theoretic framework. We focus on three fission algorithms (democracy, community and despotism) that fall on a spectrum from a democratic to a dictatorial collective decision. We parameterize our social networks with data from wild baboons ( Papio cynocephalus ) and compare our simulated fissions with actual baboon fission events. We find that the democracy and community algorithms (egalitarian decisions where each individual influences the outcome) better maintain social networks during simulated fissions than despotic decisions (driven primarily by a single individual). We also find that egalitarian decisions are better at predicting the observed individual-level outcomes of observed fissions, although the observed fissions often disturbed their social networks more than the simulated egalitarian fissions.

Practicing Democracy from Childhood

Democracy manifests itself in a range of ways and is an imperfect, dynamic struggle for collective decision-making. This article discusses the multifaceted processes of deliberative democratic praxis found in traditional Māori society. Central to decision-making in te ao Māori, hui provide formal and informal structures for deliberative democracy, precedent setting, learning, and transformation through consensus making, inclusive debate, and discussion across all levels of society. Rather than coercion and voting, rangatira relied on a complex mix of customary values and accomplished oratory skills to explore issues in family and community meetings and in public assemblies. Decisions made through inclusive deliberative processes practiced in hui established evident reasoning and responsibility for all community members to uphold the reached consensus. This article claims that practicing deliberative democracy as a fundamental way of life, learned through ongoing active and meaningful participation throughout childhood, improves the integrity of democratic decision-making.

IDB Behavioral Economics Group: Project Highlights of the Last Decade

The IDB Behavioral Economics Group is an interdepartmental working group on behavioral economics. For nearly a decade, armed with the tools and insights offered by psychology and economics, the IDB has been partnering with local and national governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to promote knowledge related to individual and collective decision-making in the region. Through this work, we hope to serve our countries better and continue improving peoples' lives.

The problem of no hands: responsibility voids in collective decisions

The problem of no hands concerns the existence of so-called responsibility voids: cases where a group makes a certain decision, yet no individual member of the group can be held responsible for this decision. Criteria-based collective decision procedures play a central role in philosophical debates on responsibility voids. In particular, the well-known discursive dilemma has been used to argue for the existence of these voids. But there is no consensus: others argue that no such voids exist in the discursive dilemma under the assumption that casting an untruthful opinion is eligible. We argue that, under this assumption, the procedure used in the discursive dilemma is indeed immune to responsibility voids, yet such voids can still arise for other criteria-based procedures. We provide two general characterizations of the conditions under which criteria-based collective decision procedures are immune to these voids. Our general characterizations are used to prove that responsibility voids are ruled out by criteria-based procedures involving an atomistic or monotonic decision function. In addition, we show that our results imply various other insights concerning the logic of responsibility voids.

Exiles as Stakeholders

This chapter examines how much influence exiles are entitled to wield in the homeland. I situate this question in the broader boundary problem in democratic theory: how to determine who is entitled to participate in collective decision-making. I examine two leading principles of inclusion, and then elaborate on and apply the stakeholder principle: insofar as exiles have particular interests at stake, they are entitled to a correspondingly weighty say. The stakeholder principle admits of a hierarchy of stake and say, which protects against the moral hazards of ‘long-distance nationalism’ while reaffirming that identification alone entitles exiles to some say. I outline three types of interests exiles can have at stake and illustrate the competing interests within a stakeholder community, and the problem of some exiles having disproportionate influence. The stakeholder principle correctly diagnoses worries about ‘armchair revolutionaries’: the problem with exile influence is not when exiles have a say, but when they have too much of a say relative to others.