A Probabilistic Voting Model of Indirect Taxation

2011 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Canegrati
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Indirect Taxation ◽  
Voting Model

scholarly journals Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model

Public Choice ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 164 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 379-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan K. Brueckner ◽  
Kangoh Lee
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Negative Campaigning ◽  
Voting Model

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Zakharov ◽  
Constantine S. Sorokin
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Policy Convergence ◽  
Voting Model

scholarly journals Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-641
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Strategic Ambiguity ◽  
Voting Model

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72

scholarly journals Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Religious Issues ◽  
Voting Model

In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is sufficiently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in “concave issues” and diverge in “convex issues.” (JEL D72)

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