scholarly journals Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima

In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is sufficiently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in “concave issues” and diverge in “convex issues.” (JEL D72)

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-641
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72


Author(s):  
ARON LARSSON ◽  
JIM JOHANSSON ◽  
LOVE EKENBERG ◽  
MATS DANIELSON

We present a decision tree evaluation method for analyzing multi-attribute decisions under risk, where information is numerically imprecise. The approach extends the use of additive and multiplicative utility functions for supporting evaluation of imprecise statements, relaxing requirements for precise estimates of decision parameters. Information is modeled in convex sets of utility and probability measures restricted by closed intervals. Evaluation is done relative to a set of rules, generalizing the concept of admissibility, computationally handled through optimization of aggregated utility functions. Pros and cons of two approaches, and tradeoffs in selecting a utility function, are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipe M. Bujold ◽  
Simone Ferrari-Toniolo ◽  
Leo Chi U Seak ◽  
Wolfram Schultz

AbstractDecisions can be risky or riskless, depending on the outcomes of the choice. Expected Utility Theory describes risky choices as a utility maximization process: we choose the option with the highest subjective value (utility), which we compute considering both the option’s value and its associated risk. According to the random utility maximization framework, riskless choices could also be based on a utility measure. Neuronal mechanisms of utility-based choice may thus be common to both risky and riskless choices. This assumption would require the existence of a utility function that accounts for both risky and riskless decisions. Here, we investigated whether the choice behavior of macaque monkeys in riskless and risky decisions could be described by a common underlying utility function. We found that the utility functions elicited in the two choice scenarios were different from each other, even after taking into account the contribution of subjective probability weighting. Our results suggest that distinct utility representations exist for riskless and risky choices, which could reflect distinct neuronal representations of the utility quantities, or distinct brain mechanisms for risky and riskless choices. The different utility functions should be taken into account in neuronal investigations of utility-based choice.


Metamorphosis ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
Afreen Arif H. ◽  
T.P.M. Pakkala

Most of the utility functions studied earlier concentrated on properties of risk aversion. In this article, the authors have introduced a new class of utility function called the Power Law with Exponential Cut-off (PLEC) utility function, which exhibits all the absolute and relative risk aversion and risk loving preferences of individuals, under various conditions. It generalises and encompasses other systems of utility functions like that of exponential power. Certain properties of this utility function are discussed. Sensitivity analysis exhibits different portfolio allocations for various risk preferences. The analysis also shows that arbitrary risk preferences may lead to biased risk response estimates. Performance of PLEC utility function in portfolio allocation problem is demonstrated through numerical examples. This is evaluated through optimal solutions.


2007 ◽  
Vol 129 (5) ◽  
pp. 584-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gürdal Arslan ◽  
Jason R. Marden ◽  
Jeff S. Shamma

We consider an autonomous vehicle-target assignment problem where a group of vehicles are expected to optimally assign themselves to a set of targets. We introduce a game-theoretical formulation of the problem in which the vehicles are viewed as self-interested decision makers. Thus, we seek the optimization of a global utility function through autonomous vehicles that are capable of making individually rational decisions to optimize their own utility functions. The first important aspect of the problem is to choose the utility functions of the vehicles in such a way that the objectives of the vehicles are localized to each vehicle yet aligned with a global utility function. The second important aspect of the problem is to equip the vehicles with an appropriate negotiation mechanism by which each vehicle pursues the optimization of its own utility function. We present several design procedures and accompanying caveats for vehicle utility design. We present two new negotiation mechanisms, namely, “generalized regret monitoring with fading memory and inertia” and “selective spatial adaptive play,” and provide accompanying proofs of their convergence. Finally, we present simulations that illustrate how vehicle negotiations can consistently lead to near-optimal assignments provided that the utilities of the vehicles are designed appropriately.


2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. Thomson

ABSTRACTIn this paper a system for recommending investment channel choices to members of defined contribution retirement funds is proposed. The system is interactive, using a member's answers to a series of questions to derive a utility function. The observed values are interpolated by means of appropriate formulae to produce a smooth utility function over the whole positive range of benefits at retirement. The resulting function, together with stochastic models of the returns on the available channels and of the annuity factor at exit, is then used to recommend an optimum apportionment of the member's investment. The proposed system is applied to the observed values of utility functions of post-retirement income elicited from members of retirement funds. Difficulties in the application are discussed and the results are analysed. The sensitivity of the recommendations to the parameters of the stochastic model is discussed.


1977 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph L. Keeney

The interests of many groups, some with multiple objectives, are important to include in evaluating strategies affecting salmon in the Skeena River. A multiattribute utility model is proposed for addressing these issues. Two first-cut utility functions are assessed using the preferences of two individuals familiar with the problem. These utility functions provide a basis for constructive discussion to arrive at a reasonable utility function for examining alternative policies. Two unique features of this study are the explicit focus on value tradeoffs and equity considerations among interest groups, and a comparative examination of the two first-cut multiattribute utility models. This examination indicates the range of fundamental preferences which can be captured using multiattribute utility functions and illustrates the potential of the theory for conflict illumination and resolution.


Author(s):  
Prativa Rai ◽  
Mrinal Kanti Ghose ◽  
Hiren Kumar Deva Sarma

Cognitive radio enabled wireless sensor network is capable of reducing the spectrum scarcity problem of the wireless networks. Looking at the scarcity of available bandwidth, and the high growth in the number of communication devices in recent times, cognitive radio technology has proven to be a promising technology for the days to come. The application of Game Theory in cognitive radio networks has been visible in recent research works. However, only limited literature is available in which possibilities of applying the game-theory based approaches for the challenging task of channel assignment in cognitive radio wireless sensor are available in the literature. It is understood that the crux of the solution to the problem of scheming games for allocation of the channel is centered on the selection of the utility function in order to increase the efficiency of the channel allocation algorithm. Accordingly, the study regarding the influence of several utility functions on the performance of the corresponding channel allocation algorithm is important.  Such a study enables designers to arrive at the optimal utility function to be used in game-theory based channel allocation algorithms, and the same is explored to the best extent, in this paper. The detailed procedure of allocating channels to all the contending nodes through game-based channel allocation has been discussed in this paper. Moreover, the performance of six different utility functions proposed which can be used for channel allocation using game theory has been evaluated for respective performances through MATLAB-based simulations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 265-279
Author(s):  
Lisa Hellerstein ◽  
Devorah Kletenik

Deshpande et al. presented a k(ln R + 1) approximation bound for Stochastic Submodular Cover, where k is the state set size, R is the maximum utility of a single item, and the utility function is integer-valued. This bound is similar to the ln Q/(eta+1) bound given by Golovin and Krause, whose analysis was recently found to have an error. Here Q >= R is the goal utility and eta is the minimum gap between Q and any attainable utility Q' < Q. We revisit the proof of the k(ln R + 1) bound of Deshpande et al., fill in the details of the proof of a key lemma, and prove two bounds for real-valued utility functions: k(ln R_1 + 1) and (ln R_E + 1). Here R_1 equals the maximum ratio between the largest increase in utility attainable from a single item, and the smallest non-zero increase attainable from that same item (in the same state). The quantity R_E equals the maximum ratio between the largest expected increase in utility from a single item, and the smallest non-zero expected increase in utility from that same item. Our bounds apply only to the stochastic setting with independent states.


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