An empirical study on paying rate of basic pension insurance based on probabilistic voting model

Author(s):  
Rong Li ◽  
Lin Jian
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jadranka Đurović-Todorović ◽  
Marina Đorđević ◽  
Milica Ristić-Cakić

The problem of pension financing in the system of mandatory pension insurance in the Republic of Serbia became actual after the great economic crisis of the 1990s, although this problem had been present before. Accordingly, considerable attention has been paid to the analysis of determinants of pension expenditures. Considering the fact that in the Republic of Serbia the possibilities for reducing expenditures in the system of mandatory state pension and disability insurance have already been exhausted by reforms so far, it is necessary to consider other measures and possibilities for changing the design of the pension disability system. Therefore, the subject of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between pension beneficiaries, the type and amount of pensions. The aim of the paper is to analyze the influence of the pension beneficiary and the type of pension on the amount of the pension, based on the analysis of the collected data.


Public Choice ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 164 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 379-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan K. Brueckner ◽  
Kangoh Lee

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Zakharov ◽  
Constantine S. Sorokin

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-641
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima

In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is sufficiently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in “concave issues” and diverge in “convex issues.” (JEL D72)


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