scholarly journals Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 626-641
Author(s):  
Yasushi Asako
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Strategic Ambiguity ◽  
Voting Model

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72

scholarly journals Voter Preferences, Polarization, and Electoral Policies

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 203-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichiro Kamada ◽  
Fuhito Kojima
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Religious Issues ◽  
Voting Model

In most variants of the Hotelling-Downs model of election, it is assumed that voters have concave utility functions. This assumption is arguably justified in issues such as economic policies, but convex utilities are perhaps more appropriate in others, such as moral or religious issues. In this paper, we analyze the implications of convex utility functions in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model with a polarized voter distribution. We show that the equilibrium policies diverge if and only if voters' utility function is sufficiently convex. If two or more issues are involved, policies converge in “concave issues” and diverge in “convex issues.” (JEL D72)

scholarly journals Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model

Public Choice ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 164 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 379-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan K. Brueckner ◽  
Kangoh Lee
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Negative Campaigning ◽  
Voting Model

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei V. Zakharov ◽  
Constantine S. Sorokin
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Voting ◽  
Policy Convergence ◽  
Voting Model

Growth and Convergence of Social Sectors’ Expenditure in Indian States: Upshots from Neoclassical Growth and Panel Unit Roots Models

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-83
Author(s):  
Ramesh Chandra Das ◽  
Enrico Ivaldi
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Unit Roots ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Social Expenditure ◽  
Indian States ◽  
Panel Unit Roots ◽  
Income Disparities ◽  
Social Expenditures ◽  
Neoclassical Growth ◽  
Social Sectors

In a world of having large part suffering from the inadequacies of basic needs and inter-class and inter-regional income disparities, investing upon the development of different social sectors from the state exchequers have been one of the top agendas of the policymakers. It is not a different issue for the states and provinces of the developing countries like India. Besides having positive roles on economic betterment, spending on social expenditures sometimes work in favour of the ruling political parties to gain confidence from the voters. The states thus compete in this area. Under this background, the present study attempts to examine whether the states of India are converging in social sector’s expenditure for the period 1980–81 to 2017–18. Applying the neoclassical growth and panel unit roots models the study observes unambiguously that there are absolute and conditional β convergence and σ convergence in per capita social expenditure among the states. JEL Classification: H72, O470, C23, O530

Design of comprehensive income products for retirement using utility functions

2021 ◽  
pp. 031289622098532
Author(s):  
Geoffrey J Warren
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Comprehensive Income ◽  
Product Features

An approach for designing a menu of comprehensive income products for retirement (CIPRs) is proposed and demonstrated. The approach entails four steps: defining and characterising member types based on selected attributes; specifying a utility function to capture the objectives and preferences for each member type; conducting analysis of candidate investment and drawdown strategies, and hence select a product design; and communication to members. The last step uses attributes to describe the type of investor for which a product is designed, as well as setting out the key product features and the outcomes it may deliver. JEL Classification: D14, D15, E21, G11, G23

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