A Review on Withholding Tax and the Need for Taxpayer Protection - Focusing on the Argument for Automatic Confirmation and Commentary on Recent Precedents -

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-75
Author(s):  
Wan Choi
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lawrence L. Kreicher ◽  
Robert N. McCauley

AbstractThe United States has ceded to the rest of the world managing the dollar’s value. For a generation, the U.S. authorities have all but withdrawn from the foreign exchange market. Yet the dollar does not float freely as a result of this hands-off U.S. policy. Instead, other authorities manage the dollar exchange rates, albeit separately. These authorities make heavier purchases of dollars in its downswings than in the upswings, damping its decline. Thus, the Fed finds that accommodative monetary policy transmits less to U.S. manufacturing and traded services, and relies on still lower rates to stimulate interest-sensitive housing and auto demand. The current U.S. dollar policy of naming and shaming surplus-running countries accumulating foreign exchange reserves does not seem to work. Three alternatives warrant consideration. First, the U.S. could reinstate its withholding tax on interest income received by non-residents and even add policy criteria to bilateral tax treaties. Second, the U.S. authorities could retaliate by selling dollars against the currencies of dollar-buying jurisdictions running chronic surpluses. However, either the withholding tax or such retaliatory foreign exchange intervention pose huge practical challenges. Third, the U.S. authorities could re-enter the foreign exchange market, making large-scale asset purchases in foreign currency when the dollar rises sharply against its average value. Such a policy would encourage private investment in U.S. traded goods and service production. The challenge is to set ex ante foreign exchange intervention rules to guide market participants’ expectations, even positioning them to do the authorities’ work.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Charoline Cheisviyanny

This research aims to offer some solutions to recover tax revenue pasca Covid-19 pandemy. This research is an explorative research with a quantitative approach. The data used was the annual reports of companies listed in BEI. This research used purposive sampling method to select samples and got 219 samples for 2017 and 217 samples for 2018. The proposed suggestions in recovering tax revenue are: (1) optimalization of withholding tax mechanism, (2) final tax imposition for non SMEs, and (3) reduction of tax audit and tax dispute. These suggestions need further dan depth review before implemented.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-255
Author(s):  
Son, Young Chul
Keyword(s):  

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 84 (6) ◽  
pp. 1109-1109

If you want a child-care credit for 1989. . . it may be good to look now at new rules, effective in 1989, for taking independent-care credits or the income exclusion for care benefits provided by employers. To qualify for either, 1989 returns will have to list all care providers' names, addresses, and Social Security or employer numbers. One way to get the information is to ask providers to fill out a new Form W-10, which spells out the rules and is available from the IRS. The W-10 is for your records, not part of a return. But if your return gives wrong information, you can avoid losing your tax benefit by showing the form to prove "due diligence" in trying to get correct data. Instead of a W-10, the IRS also will accept a copy of a provider's Social Security card, driver's license, letterhead, invoice, W-4 withholding-tax form, or employer statement—if the required data is shown.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1425-1452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thiess Buettner ◽  
Carolin Holzmann ◽  
Felix Kreidl ◽  
Hendrik Scholz

Abstract This paper explores withholding-tax non-compliance in the context of dividend taxation. It focuses on a specific type of stock-market transactions around ex-dividend dates, so-called “cum-ex” trades, which caused considerable revenue losses due to illegitimate tax refunds in Germany and other countries. We use a stylized model of the stock-market equilibrium to analyze the incentives of traders on the German stock market and find that cum-ex trades are only profitable for both buyer and seller in the presence of collusive tax fraud. Our empirical analysis of market data for publicly traded German stocks from 2009 to 2015 confirms that transaction numbers of stocks suitable for cum-ex trades show the expected increase shortly before ex-dividend dates in the period before the tax refunding was reformed. In line with the collusion hypothesis, effects on stock-market prices are not found.


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