scholarly journals The True or False Theory and confucian practical Studies of the late Hagok School

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (null) ◽  
pp. 83-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
김윤경
Keyword(s):  
False Theory

scholarly journals Nikola Milosevic as critic of Marxism

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dejan Stankovic
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Attitudes ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Logical Consistency ◽  
Ethical Argument ◽  
False Theory ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Real Socialism

In this essay, author analyses Nikola Milosevic's critique of Marxism. His methodological approach is the mixture of philosophy, literature and positive sciences, mostly psychology and history. His argument against Marxism consists of two parts: practical, mostly, ethical and political, and theoretical, mostly, methodological and epistemic. Ethical argument against Marxism is based on the idea of critical reconsideration of the relation between goals and means. For Milosevic, Marxism and real socialism are obvious examples of maxim: ?Goal justifies any means necessary for its achievement?. Such ethical standpoint justifies the regime of terror and manipulation. On the other hand, at the methodological and epistemic level, Marxism is an overt example of false theory in positivistic sense. It lacks logical consistency and empirical evidence. Being a theory without a scientific grounds, Marxism is a mere projection of the psychological and political attitudes of its author. Marxism is not a theory in traditional philosophical sense, it is just a theoretical rationalization of basic psychological and political attitudes of it creator and his successors.

scholarly journals Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maciej Sendłak
Keyword(s):  
False Theory ◽  
Opposite View ◽  
Alternative Theories ◽  
Sentential Operator

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix (i.e., the sentential operator ‘According to fiction F, P’) is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem.

scholarly journals II.—Do the Crystalline Gneisses represent portions of the Original Earth's Crust?

1897 ◽  
Vol 4 (12) ◽  
pp. 537-543
Author(s):  
Joseph Lomas
Keyword(s):  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Earth’S Crust ◽  
False Theory ◽  
Earth's Crust ◽  
Made In

In order that progress may be made in any branch of geology, it is necessary, not only that the faculties of observation and inductive reasoning should be employed, but a proper use should be made of the imagination. By this means new lines of research are laid out. The theory we set ourselves to prove may eventually prove to be wrong, but it often happens that the pursuit of a false theory brings one as near the truth as the following up of a true one. It is in this spirit I wish you to regard the problems and speculations to which I now invite your attention.

How We Can Be Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony

Philosophy ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn A. Hartz
Keyword(s):  
Human Evolution ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Anna Karenina ◽  
False Theory ◽  
Inadequate Knowledge

From Colin Radford we have inherited the ‘fiction paradox’: How can we be moved by creatures of fiction? Answers recently offered by aestheticians presuppose a false theory of emotion and are inconsistent with emotional phenomenology as well as facts about human evolution, physiology, and anatomy. I argue that Kendall Walton's ‘Charles’ can genuinely fear the slime and yet avow that he does not consider it dangerous—all without being irrational. The solutions offered by Morreall, Moran, Hyslop, Boruah, Lamarque, and Neill are rejected as inadequate. Knowledge of how we can be moved probably lies outside philosophy altogether—in cognitive neuroscience.

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