Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism

The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix (i.e., the sentential operator ‘According to fiction F, P’) is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem.

Nikola Milosevic as critic of Marxism

In this essay, author analyses Nikola Milosevic's critique of Marxism. His methodological approach is the mixture of philosophy, literature and positive sciences, mostly psychology and history. His argument against Marxism consists of two parts: practical, mostly, ethical and political, and theoretical, mostly, methodological and epistemic. Ethical argument against Marxism is based on the idea of critical reconsideration of the relation between goals and means. For Milosevic, Marxism and real socialism are obvious examples of maxim: ?Goal justifies any means necessary for its achievement?. Such ethical standpoint justifies the regime of terror and manipulation. On the other hand, at the methodological and epistemic level, Marxism is an overt example of false theory in positivistic sense. It lacks logical consistency and empirical evidence. Being a theory without a scientific grounds, Marxism is a mere projection of the psychological and political attitudes of its author. Marxism is not a theory in traditional philosophical sense, it is just a theoretical rationalization of basic psychological and political attitudes of it creator and his successors.

The revisability of commonsense psychology

Various views of the mind/body problem adopt one of the two general strategies towards explaining phenomena: one approach is to take into account the intuitions found in common sense, and the second is to go against those intuitions. The first type of theory attempts to ground views of particular phenomena on our common sense. Eliminative Materialism (EM) is not such an approach. EM urges that commonsense psychology is false and should be replaced by neuroscience. Eliminativism has often been challenged. Some have attacked the premise that commonsense psychology is a theory; others have attacked the claim that it is a false theory, which can be replaced. I plan to countenance the argument that commonsense psychology is an empirical theory that can be replaced, which will, surprisingly, lead me to an argument against eliminativism. My view is that commonsense psychology cannot be eliminated because there are no commonsense theories.