Application of J. Haidt Moral Psychology Theory to Refine Moral Education Methods

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Changwoo Jeong ◽  
Jachun Seok
Author(s):  
Keimpe A. Algra

Posidonius of Apamea (Syria) was a Stoic philosopher and student of Panaetius. He taught in Rhodes. He combined a passion for detailed empirical research with a general commitment to the basic systematics of Stoic philosophy (which, however, he was willing to revise where necessary). As such he was probably the most ‘scientific’ of the Stoics. His wide-ranging investigations of all kinds of physical phenomena (especially in the areas of physical astronomy and meteorology) became particularly renowned, the best known case being his explanation of Atlantic tides as connected with the motions of the moon. His most original philosophical contributions are to be located in the connected areas of psychology and ethics. Posidonius appears to have been committed to a slightly Platonizing version of Stoic psychology, according to which the passions are no longer regarded as a malfunctioning of the rational faculty, but as motions of the soul which take their origin in two separate irrational faculties (anger and appetite). This revised moral psychology is accompanied by some corresponding revisions in ethics such as the conception of moral education as the blunting of the motions of the irrational faculties.


Hypatia ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Khin Zaw

Wollstonecraft's early works express a coherent view of moral psychology, moral education and moral philosophy which guides the construction of her early fiction and educational works. It includes a valuable account of the relation between reason and feeling in moral development. Failure to recognize the complexity and coherence of the view and unhistorical readings have led to mistaken criticisms of Wollstonecraft's position. Part I answers these criticisms; Part II describes and textually supports her view.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-149
Author(s):  
Deborah S. Mower ◽  

The primary problem we face when educating for social justice involves making problems and issues ‘real’ in ways that enable deep comprehension of the nature of injustice, the effects of systemic and dynamic causes, and the interaction of structures and policies on the lives of individuals. To address this problem, I examine work from behavioral economics and moral psychology as theoretical resources. I argue that we can glean insights from the notions of behavioral nudges and virtue labeling and propose a new account of nudges, which I call experiential nudges. Experiential nudges provide an important mechanism in educating for social justice, in particular, and can be extended within moral education more broadly.


Author(s):  
Franco V. Trivigno

This chapter foregrounds aspects of Plato’s thinking about virtue that may be useful for contemporary virtue ethicists. First, Plato presents Socrates’ self-knowledge as a kind of ‘moral epistemic humility,’ and this notion may be important for theories that set a high bar for moral knowledge. Second, Plato provides various models—with wisdom at the forefront—for configuring the relationship amongst the virtues. Third, Plato’s view that virtue is sufficient for happiness, though external goods contribute to one’s level of happiness, represents an underexplored option in contemporary work. Fourth, very few scholars have drawn from Plato’s rich account of the moral psychology of eros, or love, in the development and maintenance of the proper attitude toward virtue. Finally, Plato’s political thought, in which the state’s central task is tend to the virtue and happiness of its citizens, may provide a rich resource for those interested in moral education and virtue politics.


2019 ◽  
pp. 266-291
Author(s):  
Kristján Kristjánsson

Aristotelianism is all the rage in contemporary virtue ethics. Yet given how anachronistic Aristotle’s account of the meta-virtue of megalopsychia seems to be, there is a tendency to pass over it in silence. This chapter argues against such a move and maintain that Aristotle’s ideal can help illuminate a number of contemporary debates. In moral psychology, megalopsychia helps mediate between realist and anti-realist conceptions of selfhood. In moral education, megalopsychia casts light on the levels of moral development to which we can aspire through the cultivation of character, as well as the necessary individualization of education in virtue. In moral philosophy, megalopsychia helps crystallize debates about role moralities and the demands of noblesse oblige; the relationship between objective and subjective well-being; and to what extent contemplation and self-transcendence enter into well-being. This chapter provides a whistle-stop tour of those topics and explains the lessons Aristotle’s account of megalopsychia can teach us about them.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 101-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Darnell ◽  
Liz Gulliford ◽  
Kristján Kristjánsson ◽  
Panos Paris

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (87) ◽  
pp. 143-185
Author(s):  
이정렬 ◽  
Changwoo Jeong

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross A. Thompson

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.


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