Coercion and Privatization

Privatization ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 145-168
Author(s):  
Jessica Flanigan

This chapter defends a moral presumption against the governmental provision of services. This non-instrumentalist defense of privatization contrasts with non-instrumentalist defenses of the governmental provision of services and instrumentalist arguments in favor of governmental or private provision of service. The author argues that non-instrumental normative considerations favor privatization because people cannot consent to the governmental provision of services and all else equal it is morally better if people consent to provide and receive services. Furthermore, without citizens’ consent, governments do not have the authority to tax citizens in order to provide services. And in most circumstances, citizens do not have enforceable duties to provide public goods to their compatriots so it is wrong for public officials to coerce them to do so..

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.


1995 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Buchholz ◽  
Kai A. Konrad

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber ◽  
Philipp C. Wichardt

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