Balancing Acts

Author(s):  
Michael J. Saks ◽  
Barbara A. Spellman

Many rules of evidence employ balancing tests. The best known is Rule 403, requiring a judge to compare the probative value of evidence against (for example) its prejudicial effect. The problem of metacognition arises when a trial judge is making a decision in a specific case. The required balancing involves more than knowing a rule and the import of the evidence: it engages the judge’s beliefs about how jurors’ cognitive and emotional processes work, predicting how they will respond to the evidence, and comparing that to how the judge thinks the evidence ought best to be responded to. For some categories of evidence, the rulemakers have performed the metacognitive balancing for the judge, deciding that because jurors likely will over-value the evidence, it is best to prevent the jury from hearing those types of evidence. Sometimes the rules aim to encourage socially desirable behavior. For example, to promote repairs of dangerous situations, the rules bar using the fact that repairs were made to prove negligence. A well-established body of research on the “hindsight bias” supports the law’s suspicion that jurors will use evidence of the accident and the repair to answer the question of whether the risk should have been recognized ex ante, and conclude that the failure to correct the situation earlier was negligent. Balancing tests make good psychological sense in theory. Much remains to be learned, however, about whether they “work” (that is, are efficient, lead to good results, encourage socially-desirable behavior) in practice.

1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 213-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ariens

Twentieth-century reform of the American law of evidence was initially premised on the ideals of legal progressivism, ideals splintered by American legal realism. In preparing the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence from 1939 to 1942, Harvard Law School professor Edmund M. Morgan attempted to reconstitute the framework of reform in light of the challenge of legal realism. The Model Code was based on granting greater discretion to the trial judge and changing the goals of the trial from a search for truth to a “rational” resolution of disputes. In large part due to these apparently radical and “corrosive” changes, the Model Code failed to win professional support and was not adopted by any state. The structure of the Model Code was used for the two subsequent evidence codification efforts, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence. These codification efforts found greater academic favor in part because they fit within the post-World War II jurisprudence of reasoned elaboration. The Federal Rules also enjoyed extraordinary professional favor because the drafters explicitly affirmed truth as the goal of the rules. The irony is that the framework of the Federal Rules, since they are based on the Model Code, contradicts this message.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1031
Author(s):  
Jesse Schupack

Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is an outlier. The Rule mandates admission of impeaching evidence of a witness’s past convictions for crimes of dishonesty. It is the only place in the Rules where judges are denied their usual discretion to exclude evidence on the grounds that its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. This Note analyzes three assumptions underlying this unusual Rule: (1) that there is a coherently definable category of crimes of dishonesty, (2) that convictions for crimes of dishonesty are uniquely probative of a person’s character, and (3) that an assessment of moral character based on past convictions will be suitably predictive of a person’s reliability as a witness. These assumptions are false and so do not justify the mandatory admission of convictions under the Rule. The final Part of this Note argues that Rule 609(a)(2) is better understood as operating on an implicit principle of forfeiture. Recognizing this and modifying the structure of the Rule accordingly cures some of its current defects. But these revisions still leave something deeply concerning about Rule 609(a)(2). The logic of forfeiture substitutes a normative judgment about a particular class of people in place of an evidentiary judgment about the probative value of a certain kind of information. This Note concludes that this substitution is unprincipled and unjust, and that therefore Rule 609(a)(2) should be eliminated.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 319-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pettit

Picture this: a party to a lawsuit proposes to show jurors images of a human brain to support its claim or defense. The other party objects, and the trial judge must make a ruling. What determines how the judge will rule? That is the question I attempt to address.I begin in Part II by describing very briefly some existing methods of brain imaging—how they work and what they try to do—and cataloging some possible uses of these methods in courtrooms. Part III discusses current legal standards of admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). Part IV examines the particular problem of scientific evidence offered to establish that a person was or was not telling the truth. Part V provides a brief history of some past attempts to introduce brain-imaging evidence into courtrooms. The article concludes with some general comments on the issues facing judges when parties to lawsuits offer brain-imaging evidence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Simon ◽  
Keith J. Holyoak

Abstract Cushman characterizes rationalization as the inverse of rational reasoning, but this distinction is psychologically questionable. Coherence-based reasoning highlights a subtler form of bidirectionality: By distorting task attributes to make one course of action appear superior to its rivals, a patina of rationality is bestowed on the choice. This mechanism drives choice and action, rather than just following in their wake.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Bernstein ◽  
Ragav Kumar ◽  
Daniel J. Levitin
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Fagerlin ◽  
Dylan Smith ◽  
Peter Ubel
Keyword(s):  

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