Ranked-Choice Voting as Reprieve from the Court-Ordered Map

Thus far, legal debates about the rise of ranked-choice voting have centered on whether legislatures can lawfully adopt the practice. This Note turns attention to the courts and the question of remedies. It proposes that courts impose ranked-choice voting as a redistricting remedy. Ranked-choice voting allows courts to cure redistricting violations without also requiring that they draw copious numbers of districts, a process the Supreme Court has described as a “political thicket.” By keeping courts away from the fact-specific, often arbitrary judgments involved in redistricting, ranked-choice voting makes for the redistricting remedy that best protects the integrity of the judicial role.

Racial Revisionism

A Review of The Enigma of Clarence Thomas. by Corey Robin.

Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges

A Review of Law as Data: Computation, Text, & the Future of Legal Analysis. Edited by Michael A. Livermore and Daniel N. Rockmore.

Structural Labor Rights

American labor law was designed to ensure equal bargaining power between workers and employers. But workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression— the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility. But decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. Economists and legal scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation to protect workers’ collective rights, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power over workers. Existing labor and antitrust law have failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while constraining workers’ ability to do the same. The dissolution of workers’ collective rights has resulted in spiking income inequality: workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income for decades. To resolve this crisis, some scholars have advocated for ambitious labor law reforms, like sector-wide bargaining, while others have turned to antitrust law to tackle employer power. While these proposals are vital, they overlook an existing opportunity already contained in the labor law that would avoid the political and doctrinal obstacles to such large-scale reforms. This Article argues for a “structural” approach to the labor law that revives and modernizes its equal bargaining power purpose through deploying innovative social scientific analysis. A “structural” approach is one that takes into account workers’ bargaining power relative to employers in determining the scope of substantive labor rights and in resolving disputes. Because employers’ current buyer power strengthens their ability to indefinitely hold out on worker demands in the employment bargain, the “structural” approach seeks to deploy social scientific tools to tailor the labor law’s provisions so that they resituate workers to a bargaining position from which they could equally hold out. This Article makes three key contributions. First, it documents the dispersion and misalignment of workers’ collective rights under current labor law, detailing the historical narrowing of workers’ collective rights to limited tactics by a small set of workers against highly protected individual enterprises and the concomitant rise of employer power (Part I). Second, it introduces and schematizes the wealth of social scientific literature relevant for evaluating the relative bargaining power of employers and employees (Part II). And finally, it offers concrete proposals for how to apply these social scientific tools and insights to three areas of the National Labor Relation Board’s adjudication and regulatory authority: the determination of “employer”/”employee” status, the determination of employees’ substantive rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the determination of what counts as sanctionable unfair labor practices under section 8 of the NLRA (Part III).

Do ESG Funds Deliver on Their Promises?

Corporations have received growing criticism for contributing to climate change, perpetuating racial and gender inequality, and failing to address other pressing social issues. In response to these concerns, shareholders are increasingly focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in selecting investments, and asset managers are responding by offering a growing number of ESG mutual funds. The flow of assets into ESG is one of the most dramatic trends in asset management. But are these funds giving investors what they promise? This question has attracted the attention of regulators, with the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) both taking steps to rein in ESG funds. The change in administration has created an opportunity to rethink these steps, but the rapid growth and evolution of the market mean regulators are acting without a clear picture of ESG investing. We fill this gap by offering the most complete empirical overview of ESG mutual funds to date. Combining comprehensive data on mutual funds with proprietary data from the several of the most significant ESG ratings firms, we provide a unique picture of the current ESG environment with an eye to informing regulatory policy. We evaluate a number of criticisms of ESG funds made by academics and policymakers and find them lacking. We find that ESG funds offer their investors increased ESG exposure. They also vote their shares differently from non-ESG funds and are more supportive of ESG principles. Our analysis shows that they do so without increasing costs or reducing returns. We conclude that ESG funds generally offer investors a differentiated and competitive investment product that is consistent with their labeling. In short, we see no reason to single out ESG funds for special regulation.

The Doctrine of Clarifications

Clarifications are a longstanding but little-studied concept in statutory interpretation. Most courts have found that clarifying amendments to preexisting statutes bypass retroactivity limitations. Therein lies their power. Because clarifications simply restate the law, they do not implicate the presumption against retroactivity that Landgraf v. USI Film Products embedded in civil-statute interpretation. The problem that courts have yet to address is how exactly clarifying legislation can be distinguished from legislation that substantively changes the law. What exactly is a clarification? The courts’ answers implicate many of the entrenched debates in statutory interpretation. This Note offers three primary contributions. First, it summarizes the existing doctrine of clarifications as it has been established in the federal circuits and highlights the important implications of their approaches. Second, it argues that clarifications are an important tool for courts and lawmaking bodies. Third, it provides a more intelligible taxonomy for courts to use, including specific factors that ought to guide their determination of whether an amendment clarifies the law.

The Lost Promise of Disability Rights

Children with disabilities are among the most vulnerable students in public schools. They are the most likely to be bullied, harassed, restrained, or segregated. For these and other reasons, they also have the poorest academic outcomes. Overcoming these challenges requires full use of the laws enacted to protect these students’ affirmative right to equal access and an environment free from discrimination. Yet, courts routinely deny their access to two such laws—the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504). Courts too often overlook the affirmative obligations contained in these two disability rights laws and instead assume that students with disabilities’ only legal recourse is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Regrettably the IDEA is not capable of remedying all the harms students endure. In fact, the IDEA, by its terms, extends to only a subset of students with disabilities. Even so, courts force all students to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before invoking remedies under the other two disability rights laws. By narrowly construing antidiscrimination principles and ignoring the affirmative obligations contained in disability rights laws, courts unduly restrict students’ protections under these laws. This Article solves that problem by explaining and clarifying the nuance that drives confusion in this area: the difference between the IDEA’s guarantee of a free appropriate public education and the ADA and section 504’s guarantee of equal access to public education. With that distinction clear, this Article disaggregates the types of claims that are most often erroneously obstructed by the IDEA’s exhaustion clause and then creates a framework that would allow courts to analyze and correctly apply the exhaustion clause. In doing so, it hopes to remove these laws from the IDEA’s shadow and renew their promise of equal access to educational opportunity.

Tort Law and Civil Recourse

A Review of Recognizing Wrongs. by John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky.

Two Visions of Contract

A Review of Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law. by Peter Benson.

A Perfectly Empty Gift

A Review of Almost Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire. by Sam Erman.