Head-of-State Immunity of Non-States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-70
Author(s):  
Woo-hyun KANG
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ramsden ◽  
Isaac Yeung

The scope and effect of the Head of State immunity doctrine before the International Criminal Court has prompted much discussion following the 2011 decision of the first Pre-Trial Chamber concerning the immunity of serving Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir. The ptcI held that, as a matter of customary international law, there existed an exception to Head of State immunity where such official is sought by an international court with jurisdiction, here the icc. In an apparent retreat, a differently constituted ptc in 2014 based the inapplicability of such immunity on the terms of Security Council Resolution 1593. Using the 2011 and 2014 ptc decisions as a critical lens, and drawing upon recent material, this article assesses the proper application of Head of State immunity under Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mimoza Sadushaj ◽  
Saimir Shatku ◽  
Flori Pustina ◽  
Erdi Kuka ◽  
Geraldo Taraj

Abstract Many high officials accused for crimes falling under the ICC (International Criminal Court) Statute, like the leader of Sudan Omar al-Bashir, have defended themselves against ICC prosecution using their State, diplomatic or Head of State immunity and there so invoking Art. 98 of the ICC Statute. This paper is to clarify all the incorrect claims, which abusively use Art. 98, to justify the objection of ICC prosecution in cases where the defendant has state, Head of State or diplomatic immunity due to his official capabilities. The paper conclusions will deal with the proper interpretation and application of this article and the reasoning of why Head of States and other high officials cannot be defended from the ICC prosecution using their immunity as an argument.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Angela Mudukuti

In 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stepped into uncharted waters as it issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state, then President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir. Following the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC, Al-Bashir was charged by the Court with war crimes and crimes against humanity, and in 2010, he was also charged with genocide. As a consequence, all of the states parties to the Rome Statute had a duty to arrest Al-Bashir. Several states have nonetheless failed to arrest him during country visits, allowing Al-Bashir to evade the ICC. This has given rise to a number of cases before the ICC Chambers, including this Appeals Chamber judgment regarding the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.


Author(s):  
Schabas William A

This chapter comments on Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 27 consists two paragraphs that are often confounded but fulfil different functions. Paragraph 1 denies a defence of official capacity, i.e. official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall not exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the Statute. Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by States Parties to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own Head of State to which they are entitled by virtue of customary international law. In contrast with paragraph 1, it is without precedent in international criminal law instruments.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Patrick Kimani

The development of international criminal law in the last seven decades has seen a gradual erosion of the integrity of immunities for heads of states. The journey from Nuremberg to The Hague has resulted in a permanent international criminal court. Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) disregards immunities as an effective bar to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Heads of states have been stripped of their ‘invisibility cloak’ from international criminal prosecutions. The Rome Statute places its reliance on the situation state’s authorities to cooperate with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes. A special tension is noticeable in circumstances where an incumbent head of state is accused at ICC while his or her state is placed under the general cooperation obligation. This tension is clearly manifest in the two criminal processes against Uhuru Kenyatta and Al Bashir. Bearing in mind the significant political muscle a sitting head of state wields in their state, it is quite likely that their state’s authorities will be very reluctant to discharge their cooperation obligations. The prosecution of sitting heads of states remains a challenge. Is it time to rethink the structure of the ICC or the implementation of the Statute?


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-285
Author(s):  
Abel S. Knottnerus

After their election as President and Vice-President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto asked to be excused from continuous presence during their trials at the icc. This request raised difficult questions for the Court’s Judges. First, can the accused be excused or is continuous presence a procedural requirement? Secondly, can an excusal be granted because the accused has to fulfil demanding functions as (Deputy-) Head of State or would this be a prohibited distinction on the basis of official capacity? Thirdly, under what circumstances would it be reasonable to excuse the accused? Do the daily tasks of a (Vice-) President justify an excusal? This article examines and criticizes how the Judges of the Trial Chamber(s) and subsequently of the Appeals Chamber have answered these questions. It concludes that the two Kenyan leaders have obtained extraordinary exceptions that cannot be reconciled with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute.


Author(s):  
Micheal G Kearney

Abstract In 2018, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) held that conduct preventing the return of members of the Rohingya people to Myanmar could fall within Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute, on the grounds that denial of the right of return constitutes a crime against humanity. No international tribunal has prosecuted this conduct as a discrete violation, but given the significance of the right of return to Palestinians, it can be expected that such an offence would be of central importance should the ICC investigate the situation in Palestine. This comment will review the recognition of this crime against humanity during the process prompted by the Prosecutor’s 2018 Request for a ruling as to the Court’s jurisdiction over trans-boundary crimes in Bangladesh/Myanmar. It will consider the basis for the right of return in general international law, with a specific focus on the Palestinian right of return. The final section will review the elements of the denial of right of return as a crime against humanity, as proposed by the Office of the Prosecutor in its 2019 Request for Authorization of an investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 878-893
Author(s):  
Tanja Altunjan

AbstractThe adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was widely lauded as a success with regard to the recognition and potential prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence. More than twenty years later, however, many observers are disillusioned with the ICC’s dire track record concerning the implementation of its progressive legal framework. In many cases, the Court and particularly its Prosecutor have been criticized for failing to adequately address and prioritize sexual violence, culminating in only a single final conviction since 2002. Nevertheless, the ICC’s emerging practice shows progress with regard to the conceptual understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and the realization of the Statute’s full potential in ensuring accountability for sexual crimes. Taking into account the evolving jurisprudence, the Article explores the persisting challenges and the perceived gap between aspirations and reality regarding the prosecution of sexual violence at the ICC.


Author(s):  
Luke Moffett ◽  
Clara Sandoval

Abstract More than 20 years on from the signing of the Rome Statute, delivering victim-centred justice through reparations has been fraught with legal and practical challenges. The Court’s jurisprudence on reparations only began to emerge from 2012 and struggles to find purchase on implementation on the ground. In its first few cases of Lubanga, Katanga, and Al Mahdi the eligibility and forms of reparations have been limited to certain victims, subject to years of litigation, and faced difficulties in delivery due to ongoing insecurity. This is perhaps felt most acutely in the Bemba case, where more than 5,000 victims of murder, rape and pillage were waiting for redress, and the defendant was not indigent, but where he was later acquitted on appeal, thereby extinguishing reparation proceedings. This article critically appraises the jurisprudence and practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on reparations. It looks at competing principles and rationales for reparations at the Court in light of comparative practice in international human rights law and transitional justice processes to consider what is needed to ensure that the ICC is able to deliver on its reparations mandate. An underpinning argument is that reparations at the ICC cannot be seen in isolation from other reparation practices in the states where the Court operates. Reparative complementarity for victims of international crimes is essential to maximize the positive impact that the fulfilment of this right can have on victims and not to sacrifice the legitimacy of the Court, nor quixotically strive for the impossible.


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