Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in the European Union

This chapter assesses administrative procedure and judicial review in the European Union. The requirement of judicial oversight of administrative action, which results from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States of the EU, is a general principle of EU law, and it is applicable both to proceedings before the Court of justice and before national courts, when EU law is invoked before them. The EU courts carry out a generalized review on any binding acts. Although there are certain differences between acts that may be challenged according to the different remedies provided by EU law, in order to be challengeable, the acts must fulfil several conditions. The most important are: they must be binding and produce legal effects, be definitive and be taken by EU institutions in the exercise of their competencies. Article 263 TFEU provides that the acts of EU institutions may be annulled on grounds of 'lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers'. Acts or failure to act may give rise to the liability of EU institutions.

16. Review of Legality: Grounds of Review

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the grounds for judicial review of a Union act. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies four grounds for review: lack of competence; infringement of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; and misuse of power. Judicial review, whether direct through Article 263 or indirect through Article 267, is designed to ensure that decision-making is legally accountable. The UK version contains a further section analysing the relevance of these grounds of review in the UK post-Brexit.

16. Review of Legality: Grounds of Review

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the grounds for judicial review of a Union act. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies four grounds for review: lack of competence; infringement of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; and misuse of power. Judicial review, whether direct through Article 263 or indirect through Article 267, is designed to ensure that decision-making is legally accountable. The UK version contains a further section analysing the relevance of these grounds of review in the UK post-Brexit.

The German Constitutional Court’s PSPP Judgment: Impediment and Impetus for the Democratization of Europe

The article explores the understandings of democracy underlying the judgment and its implications for the democratization of Europe. I read the judgement, critically, as impediment and, constructively, as impetus for the democratization of money and society. Firstly, I recount how the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) through the construction of a “right to democracy” and the concepts of “ultra vires act” and “integration responsibility” asserted its jurisdiction over the limits of European integration. The court’s reasoning prompts me to understand the judgment not as a defense of democracy, but rather as an instance of upholding a “rule of law” that impedes the democratization of society. Secondly, I turn to the pronouncements on the demarcation of monetary from economic competences by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the FCC. I explain what I hold to be the weaknesses in the FCC’s critique of the CJEU from a doctrinal perspective. I then propose to read the PSPP judgment constructively as introducing a procedural requirement that may democratize monetary policy. Thirdly, I situate my reading of the judgment in the larger debate on the democratization of society and, more specifically, money.

Ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for habeas corpus relief in post-conviction proceedings

The doctrine of habeas corpus is that no one should be imprisoned contrary to the law of the land. The habeas corpus review is used as a form of inquiry issued to test whether a conviction or restraint is lawful. However, before having a chance to present their case before a federal forum, state prisoners have to fulfill the state’s gatekeeping requirements, such as the exhaustion of all available state remedies, requirements of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and the absence of procedural default. Procedural default arises when the state court declines to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. To overcome the procedural default the petitioner has to satisfy the “cause-and-prejudice test.” In many cases the fulfillment of the “cause” element is often based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has to satisfy the test consisting of two prongs: establishing the deficient performance of counsel and demonstrating that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In federal proceedings the rule is to raise the claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in the collateral review. However, the right to a counsel does not extend to collateral attacks upon conviction, including a post-conviction appeal. Moreover, the counsel’s deficient performance does not constitute a basis for a procedural default reversal in the post-conviction claim. The abovementioned assertation may pose a question: what happens when the defendant is eligible to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in the collateral proceeding and the counsel representing the defendant in such a proceeding does not raise the claim?The Supreme Court resolved this matter in the decision from the Martinez v. Ryan case. The Court allowed for treating inefficient assistance of post-conviction counsel as a cause that could reverse procedural default. Taking into consideration the amount of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas corpus review, the Martinez v. Ryan case may influence a fair amount of individuals seeking their constitutional rights and give them their last chance to contest unfair conviction.Nieefektywna pomoc obrońcy jako przesłanka wniosku o habeas corpus w postępowaniu po skazaniu Wniosek o habeas corpus jest środkiem, który umożliwia osobie pozbawionej wolności zbadanie przez sąd legalności jej skazania. Przed skorzystaniem z tej możliwości skazany powinien wyczerpać wszelkie możliwe środki służące ponownemu zbadaniu legalności skazania, przysługujące mu na podstawie prawa stanowego. Ponadto wnioskodawca powinien uczynić zadość wszelkim stanowym przepisom proceduralnym. W wypadku niezadośćuczynienia temu obowiązkowi sąd stanowy nie rozpozna wniosku, chyba że wnioskodawca udowodni, iż nie mógł spełnić wymogów proceduralnych z powodów, na które nie miał wpływu. Wnioskodawcy w takiej sytuacji bardzo często powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy. Zasadą jest, iż na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu przed sądem federalnym można powołać się poza postępowaniem głównym obejmującym rozpoznanie sprawy w I i II instancji. Prawo do obrony zagwarantowane w szóstej poprawce do Konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych nie rozciąga się jednak na postępowania poza postępowaniem głównym. Skazani nie mogą zatem powołać się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, aby odwrócić stan niezadośćuczynienia obowiązkom proceduralnym wynikającym z prawa stanowego. Taki stan rzeczy budził wiele wątpliwości. W wypadku gdy pełnomocnik wnioskodawcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym nie powoła się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy, który reprezentował skazanego w postępowaniu w I lub II instancji, wnioskodawca nie będzie mógł później wnosić o habeas corpus na tejże podstawie, gdyż wymagania proceduralne prawa stanowego nie zostały spełnione.Do tego problemu odniósł się Sąd Najwyższy w orzeczeniu w sprawie Martinez v. Ryan. Sąd dopuścił możliwość powołania się przez wnioskodawcę na nieefektywną pomoc obrońcy w postępowaniu poza postępowaniem głównym jako przesłankę niemożności zaspokojenia wymogów proceduralnych postępowania przed sądem stanowym. Biorąc pod uwagę, iż w ponad połowie postępowań związanych z wnioskiem o habeas corpus wnioskodawcy powołują się na nieefektywną pomoc obrońców, orzeczenie to ma ogromny wpływ na doktrynę habeas corpus.

Law Relating to Procedure

The jurisprudential distinction between substance and procedure is that substance relates to rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute, and the procedure is the means employed to determine such rights and obligations. To elucidate the above distinction between substance and procedure, we may cite Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention as example, which lays down the rule that a foreign arbitral award duly rendered becomes final and binding if, and only if, a domestic court endorses it. This procedural requirement finds its reflection in Section 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. The said procedural requirement was done away with by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (See Section 35). Also, the procedural requirement for the conduct of arbitration in the country of the applicable law is not indispensable; and it is for the local court exercising jurisdiction to determine, based upon the interests of the parties before it, its jurisdictional competence. Municipal courts apply their local law of limitation as part of their procedural law in conflicts resolution.

15. Review of Legality:

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the grounds for judicial review of a Union act. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies four grounds for review: lack of competence; infringement of an essential procedural requirement; infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; and misuse of power. Judicial review, whether direct through Article 263 or indirect through Article 267, is designed to ensure that decision-making is legally accountable.

Extraordinary Exceptions at the International Criminal Court: The (New) Rules and Jurisprudence on Presence at Trial

After their election as President and Vice-President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto asked to be excused from continuous presence during their trials at the icc. This request raised difficult questions for the Court’s Judges. First, can the accused be excused or is continuous presence a procedural requirement? Secondly, can an excusal be granted because the accused has to fulfil demanding functions as (Deputy-) Head of State or would this be a prohibited distinction on the basis of official capacity? Thirdly, under what circumstances would it be reasonable to excuse the accused? Do the daily tasks of a (Vice-) President justify an excusal? This article examines and criticizes how the Judges of the Trial Chamber(s) and subsequently of the Appeals Chamber have answered these questions. It concludes that the two Kenyan leaders have obtained extraordinary exceptions that cannot be reconciled with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute.